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POLICING PROCEDURAL ERROR IN THE
LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS
Justin Murray*
The criminal justice system depends on reviewing courts to formulate
norms of procedural law and to make sure those norms are actually followed
in the lower courts. Yet reviewing courts are not performing either of these
functions very well. No single factor can fully explain why this is the case,
for there is plenty of blame to go around. But the harmless error rule is a
major culprit. The conventional approach to harmless error review prohibits
reversal of a defendant’s conviction or sentence, even when the law was
violated during proceedings in the lower court, unless that violation
influenced the outcome below. This limitation impedes effective oversight of
the lower courts in two significant ways. First, it enables trial judges,
prosecutors, and other relevant entities (such as a district attorney’s office,
to name one example) to persistently evade accountability for procedural
errors, diminishing their incentives to comply with legal norms. And second,
it provides reviewing courts with a handy tool to avoid resolving legal claims
on their merits. Instead of holding that an error did or did not occur, thereby
helping trial judges, prosecutors, and others learn what the law requires
going forward, reviewing courts can—and often do—affirm on fact-bound
harmless error grounds without ever adjudicating the legality of the
challenged conduct.
These failings call for a major shift in how courts review procedural error.
This Article proposes that, in addition to examining whether an error affected
the outcome, as current law directs, a reviewing court should also consider
whether: (1) reversal would substantially help to prevent future errors; (2)
the error caused substantial harm to a legally protected interest unrelated to
the outcome; and (3) the benefits of reversal, as tabulated in the previous
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steps, outweigh its costs. After making the case for this framework and
discussing how to operationalize each of its components, this Article then
explores, a bit more tentatively, whether the same set of ideas could help
stimulate much-needed rethinking of other controversial rules that further
obstruct the policing of procedural error in the lower criminal courts.
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INTRODUCTION
It was an open secret for many years that trial judges across the state of
Washington allowed sheriffs to foist shackles upon in-custody adult criminal
defendants during judicial proceedings as a matter of routine, without any
case-specific finding that the restraints were necessary.1 Washington’s
appellate courts intermittently chastised the state’s trial courts about this
practice, admonishing that shackles are inhibiting, degrading, damaging to
1. See State v. Jackson (Jackson I), 447 P.3d 633, 636 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 467 P.3d 97 (Wash. 2020); see also id. at 641–42, 641 n.4 (Melnick,
J., concurring).
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the presumption of innocence, and thus unlawful absent “extraordinary
circumstances.”2 Yet in almost every recent decision condemning the
erroneous imposition of shackles, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s judgment on the theory that the errors were harmless.3 This longstanding pattern of lower court error and appellate rubber-stamping makes it
fair to wonder whether “application of the harmless error test in th[is]
area . . . has resulted in a constitutional violation without a remedy,” as one
Washington appellate judge recently suggested.4
The criminal justice system depends on reviewing courts5 to formulate
norms of procedural law and to make sure those norms are actually followed
in the lower courts.6 Yet reviewing courts are not performing either of these
functions very well. No single factor can fully explain why this is the case,
for there is plenty of blame to go around. But as the string of recent cases
from Washington involving unlawful shackling suggests, the harmless error
rule—which is “probably the most cited rule in modern criminal appeals”7—
is a major culprit. The conventional approach to harmless error review
prohibits reversal8 of a defendant’s conviction or sentence, even when the
law was violated during proceedings in the lower court, unless the violation
influenced the outcome below.9

2. E.g., State v. Finch, 975 P.2d 967, 997–1005 (Wash. 1999).
3. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 24 P.3d 1006, 1028–29 (Wash. 2001). In a case handed down
after this Article was written, the Washington State Supreme Court reversed a conviction due
to the trial court’s routinized and illegal resort to shackles, concluding that the error was not
harmless. See State v. Jackson (Jackson II), 467 P.3d 97, 105 (Wash. 2020). But according to
one of the intermediate appellate court judges who decided Jackson I, “there [were] no fewer
than 14 cases [between February 2015 and August 2019] where [Washington State] appellate
courts ha[d] found a violation of a defendant’s right to be free from shackles, yet every [one
of those cases had] resulted in harmless error.” Jackson I, 447 P.3d at 642 (Melnick, J.,
concurring).
4. Jackson I, 447 P.3d at 641 (Melnick, J., concurring). While Judge Rich Melnick
joined his colleagues in finding the shackling error in Jackson I harmless based on decisions
of the Washington State Supreme Court that he felt bound to follow, he urged the Washington
State Supreme Court to revisit those decisions in light of “what appears to be a statewide,
systemic violation.” Id. As noted earlier, the Washington State Supreme Court embraced
Judge Melnick’s suggestion in a decision rendered after this Article was written. See Jackson
II, 467 P.3d at 105.
5. As used here, “reviewing court” is an umbrella term that encompasses appellate
courts, postconviction courts, and trial courts acting in a quasi-appellate capacity (as when a
trial court considers a motion for a new trial).
6. For a discussion of these and other functions of appellate review, see generally, for
example, Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219 (2013). For
a discussion of the much-debated functions of postconviction review, specifically federal
review of state court judgments, see generally, for example, Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling
Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993).
7. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 161,
161 (2001); see also infra notes 27, 197 (discussing relevant data).
8. This Article employs the term “reversal” in an expansive and concededly imprecise
sense that extends not only to the category of relief formally known as reversal but also to
other remedies, such as vacatur, that function substantially the same way.
9. See infra Part I.A (discussing conventional harmless error rules). But cf. infra Part
I.B (discussing unorthodox harmless error rules that deviate from this pattern).
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This limitation impedes effective oversight of the lower courts in two
significant ways. First, and most importantly, the harmless error doctrine as
presently configured enables trial judges, prosecutors, and other relevant
entities10 to persistently evade accountability for procedural errors,
diminishing their incentives to comply with legal norms. Much of the
existing literature on the topic of harmless error, including my own prior
work, faults the dominant legal framework for denying redress to individual
defendants who should, in fairness, receive it.11 While this critique is on
target, academic commentary has tended to overlook or even downplay the
distinct concern that the prevailing approach to harmless error review impairs
the ability of reviewing courts to deter procedural errors.12 This Article
foregrounds that concern and develops strategies to address it.
Second, even to the extent trial judges, prosecutors, and other relevant
entities intend to abide by the law, they first need to know what the law
requires from them. But here, too, the harmless error doctrine stands in the
way, because it provides reviewing courts with a handy tool to avoid
resolving legal claims on their merits. Instead of holding that an error did or
did not occur, thereby clarifying what the law requires going forward,
reviewing courts can—and often do—affirm on fact-bound harmless error
grounds without ever adjudicating the legality of the challenged conduct.13
10. Other relevant entities may include, for example, entire courthouses, district attorneys’
offices, or the state as a whole. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.1 (explaining that reversal can function
as a collective sanction that deters at an organizational or systemic level instead of, or in
addition to, directly deterring individual judges or prosecutors).
11. See, e.g., Justin Murray, A Contextual Approach to Harmless Error Review, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1820 (2017) (criticizing outcome-centric harmless error rules because of
their potential to “systematically deprive redress [for certain kinds of harm] . . . in cases where
the evidence of guilt is overwhelming”). To address this concern, I argued for a “contextual
approach to harmless error review” that would “assess harm in relation to the constellation of
interests served by the particular procedural rule that was infringed and would not, as under
existing law, automatically confine the harmless error inquiry to estimating the error’s effect
on the outcome.” Id. at 1791; see also infra Part III.B (discussing how contextual harmless
error review intersects with the framework proposed in this Article).
12. Some scholars have argued that conventional harmless error rules produce adequate
deterrence by requiring reversal when an error has influenced the outcome, thereby reducing
any incentive to break the law for that purpose. See, e.g., Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error
in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 36–42 (1990). I explain the reasons for my disagreement with this view in Part
II.A.2 below. Others have attacked harmless error jurisprudence on deterrence grounds, as I
do, but restrict the scope of their critique (and proposed remedies) to prosecutorial errors. See,
e.g., Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 73–75
(2002). This Article, by contrast, is concerned with judicial as well as prosecutorial errors and
with larger structural problems that often contribute to errors of both types.
13. A number of other commentators have mentioned this phenomenon, but the only two
who have examined it in depth are Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional
Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847 (2005), and Kamin, supra note 12. Healy supports the practice
of using the harmless error rule (and other remedial doctrines, for that matter) to avoid novel
legal questions in constitutional adjudication. See generally Healy, supra. Kamin, on the other
hand, has argued that reviewing courts should not duck the merits by proceeding straight to
the issue of harmlessness, at least not where constitutional errors are involved, and that courts
should adopt an order-of-decision rule requiring that constitutionality be adjudicated before
harmlessness. See Kamin, supra note 12, at 38–55. While I generally share Kamin’s
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The question a reviewing court must answer when conducting harmless error
review using the conventional method—did the alleged error affect the
outcome—typically has no relevance to the legal questions trial judges and
prosecutors must answer while managing proceedings in the lower courts.14
Such rulings serve only to teach judges, prosecutors, and others what they
can get away with, not what they ought to do.
These failings call for a major shift in how courts review procedural errors.
This Article proposes that, in addition to examining whether an error affected
the outcome, as current law directs, a reviewing court should also consider
whether: (1) reversal would substantially help to prevent future errors; (2)
the error caused substantial harm to a legally protected interest unrelated to
the outcome; and (3) the benefits of reversal, as tabulated in the previous
steps, outweigh its costs. An error would thus be deemed harmful,
presumptively requiring reversal,15 either if it affected the outcome, as the
law already provides,16 or if the three-part inquiry sketched above indicates
that reversal is justified.
The first change I propose is that reviewing courts should consider whether
reversal would substantially help to prevent future errors. Because prior
illegal behavior portends a greater likelihood of future wrongdoing, courts
would need to assess whether an error that occurred below is part of a pattern
of error within or across cases, as opposed to an isolated incident. Likewise,
courts should place considerable weight on whether the conduct challenged
by the defense was obviously erroneous, as opposed to plausibly lawful, at
the time it occurred, since obvious errors point to a high likelihood of
negligent or even intentional wrongdoing (at either an individual or systemic
level). This conduct can be deterred through a credible threat of reversal
more readily than can non-negligent wrongs. These factors are not meant to
be comprehensive: other considerations, such as an intervening change in
judicial or prosecutorial policy, might play a significant role in certain cases.
But ordinarily, a court applying the first step of the proposed balancing test
skepticism of avoidance in connection with harmless error review, for reasons discussed in
Part II.B.1, infra, the cure Kamin prescribed—a mandatory decisional sequencing rule—is
likely no longer doctrinally viable in the wake of Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009),
as explained in Part II.B, infra. This Article thus explores alternative solutions that do not
involve taking away courts’ discretion over how to structure their decision-making process.
14. Specifically, outcome-determinative prejudice is legally irrelevant for most procedural
rules that trial judges and prosecutors administer but not for the subset of procedural rights
that I call “outcome-centric prejudice-based rights” (“prejudice-based rights” for short), which
“apply only when failing to apply them might cause prejudice by affecting the outcome.”
Justin Murray, Prejudice-Based Rights in Criminal Procedure, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 279
(2020). For more about this caveat, see infra note 214, and for a deeper exploration of how
this Article’s analysis of harmless error review might inform ongoing controversies
surrounding prejudice-based rights, see infra Part III.D.1.
15. I say presumptively because other doctrines besides the harmless error rule will
sometimes foreclose reversal even though an error is harmful. See, e.g., infra Part III.D.2
(discussing restrictive claim forfeiture rules and whether this Article’s proposal might be
extended to alleviate them).
16. See infra note 234 (explaining how outcome-centric harmless error rules fit within my
proposed framework as one part of a multidimensional analysis).
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would look primarily at whether the error fits within a larger pattern of
wrongdoing and whether it was obvious.
The second step of the approach defended here involves asking whether
the error caused substantial harm to a legally protected interest unrelated to
the outcome. The conventional approach to harmless error review offers
defendants some protection from errors that jeopardize their interest in
securing a favorable outcome; indeed, that is the overriding focus of the
current doctrinal setup.17 Yet criminal procedure aims to further many
different kinds of interests, some of which have little if anything to do with
the outcome. To revisit the example from the opening paragraph, rules that
restrict shackling defendants during judicial proceedings not only safeguard
the presumption of innocence—a predominantly outcome-related interest—
but also a defendant’s dignity and autonomy interests, which can be impaired
irrespective of any effect on the outcome.18 Harmless error analysis should
account for all legally protected interests that may be harmed by procedural
errors, not only to ensure adequate redress for injured parties (a point I have
made in prior work and do not emphasize here19) but also to promote
accountability for those who are responsible and to ensure that reviewing
courts engage with and clarify the relevant legal norms rather than avoiding
them.
Third and finally, reviewing courts should perform a balancing analysis to
determine whether the benefits of reversal outweigh the costs. I recognize
that here, as in many other situations, balancing is susceptible to inconsistent
application and even subversion: reviewing court judges who undervalue
criminal defendants’ procedural rights or who ascribe excessive weight to the
costs of reversal may prove reluctant to grant relief absent outcomedeterminative prejudice.20 Even so, my sense is that some judges, guided by
a different set of priorities, would make good use of the expanded authority
to reverse that this Article proposes.21 There is no way to guarantee that
reviewing courts will reverse in every case where doing so would be net
beneficial, but it is still important to entrust them with the power to reverse
in appropriate cases and to identify the salient considerations that ought to
inform their analysis.

17. There are serious reasons to suspect, however, that reviewing courts are not well
equipped to detect outcome-determinative prejudice. This is one reason why I contend that
conventional harmless error rules produce a deficient level of deterrence. See infra notes 168–
76 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons behind rules that
restrict in-court shackling).
19. See supra note 11.
20. Although this is certainly a limitation of my proposal, it is not a reason to reject it:
current law requires affirmance in virtually every case unless an error has caused outcomedeterminative prejudice, whereas some subset of those cases would rightly lead to reversal if
the approach I advocate were adopted.
21. While judges might occasionally misapply this Article’s balancing test in the opposite
direction by reversing in cases where they ought to affirm, I suspect this will not happen very
often. See infra text accompanying note 300.
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Part I introduces the relevant doctrinal landscape. Part II explains why the
conventional approach to harmless error review damages accountability and
facilitates legal avoidance, increasing the incidence of procedural violations.
Part III outlines my proposal for reforming the harmless error doctrine and
then explores, a bit more tentatively, whether a similar strategy might be used
to help rethink other controversial rules—relating to so-called prejudicebased rights22 and claim forfeiture23—that further obstruct the policing of
procedural error in the lower criminal courts.
I. THE HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE
This part describes the layout of the harmless error doctrine, which plays
a pivotal role in determining which violations of procedural law will lead to
a penalty in the form of reversal and which will prompt no systemic response.
I begin this part by discussing the conventional harmless error rules that come
under attack in Part II—rules that measure harmlessness solely by reference
to an alleged error’s probable effect on the outcome below. Then, I introduce
several unorthodox variants of the harmless error rule that contain important
features of the alternative framework I ultimately defend in Part III. Finally,
I wrap up Part I by examining two pathways to reversal for procedural
error—automatic reversal rules and reversals predicated on reviewing courts’
inherent supervisory power—that do not involve harmless error review of
any kind, conventional or otherwise. As we shall see, those pathways are
exceedingly narrow. In the vast majority of situations, defendants who seek
reversal based on procedural errors must work within the parameters of the
applicable harmless error rule—in all likelihood, a conventional, outcomecentric harmless error rule—if they are to prevail.
A. Conventional Harmless Error Rules
The harmless error rule is premised on the idea that some legal errors are
more serious than others and that not all errors are sufficiently important to
justify disturbing a lower court’s judgment.24 “Errors are the insects in the
world of law, traveling through it in swarms,” declared California Chief
Justice Roger Traynor in the opening words of his influential monograph
concerning harmless error.25 He continued: “Many are plainly harmless;
some appear ominously harmful . . . .
The well-being of the law
encompasses a tolerance for harmless errors adrift in an imperfect world.”26
Reviewing courts in our time apparently share Traynor’s belief that many of
the errors they encounter are harmless, for they rely on the harmless error

22. For a definition of prejudice-based rights, see supra note 14. For further discussion,
see infra Part III.D.1.
23. See infra Part III.D.2.
24. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759–60 (1946).
25. ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR ix (1970).
26. Id.
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rule to uphold lower court judgments with remarkable frequency in criminal
cases.27
For the sake of convenience, this Article sometimes discusses “the
harmless error rule” as though it were a single legal construct. In reality, the
“rule” has a more complex structure than this nomenclature suggests. Every
jurisdiction has its own version of the harmless error rule—several of them,
in fact.28 Even so, nearly all variations of the harmless error rule in use today
share this key feature: they measure harmlessness solely by reference to an
alleged error’s probable effect on the outcome below.29 There are some
outliers that defy this generalization, as I explain in the next section.30 But
the overall pattern, documented in this section, is quite clear.
The most widely used test for harmless error derives from the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Chapman v. California.31 Chapman held that
some kinds of constitutional error do not require automatic reversal and
instead are subject to harmless error review.32 The Court also devised a
formula for assessing harmlessness in relation to constitutional errors: such
errors are not harmless unless the prosecution can “prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error . . . did not contribute to the verdict.”33 Case
law since Chapman has narrowed its reach. As will be discussed below,
forfeited constitutional claims are now covered by a different standard, and
27. See, e.g., Stith, supra note 12, at 44 n.113 (noting that in a sample of 127 Second
Circuit criminal law rulings, “the appellate court found trial court error in 12 percent of the
issues; yet the court also found over 60 percent of these errors to be ‘harmless’”); see also
infra note 197 (discussing results from a more recent sample of federal criminal cases).
Reviewing courts’ willingness to use the harmless error rule in criminal cases has been steadily
rising over the past half century or so. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Case for a Federal
Criminal Court System (and Sentencing Reform), 108 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 951 (2020) (“A
survey of federal cases since the 1960s indicates that judicial discussions of harmless error in
criminal cases increased over tenfold from the ten-year period leading up to 1975 to the tenyear period leading up to 2019, an increase that amounts to more than three times the pace of
new federal criminal filings.”). In civil cases and cases arising under the Administrative
Procedure Act, however, the harmless error rule has played a comparatively modest role. See,
e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 253,
259 (2017) (arguing that “the rule of prejudicial error [in the Administrative Procedure Act]
has been all but forgotten”).
28. See infra notes 31–49.
29. My claim in this section has to do with modern harmless error tests, not their
precursors from earlier periods. For background regarding the history of harmless error
review in the United States, see, for example, Roger A. Fairfax Jr., A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect
One: The Early Twentieth-Century Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule, 93 MARQ. L. REV.
433 (2009).
30. See infra Part I.B.
31. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
32. See id. at 22–23. The constitutional error in Chapman, which the Court deemed
amenable to harmless error analysis, stemmed from comments by the prosecutor and
instructions by the judge inviting the jury to hold the nontestifying defendants’ silence against
them in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 19–20 (citing Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965)). Subsequent decisions have established that harmless error review applies
to most types of constitutional (and nonconstitutional) error, not just a few select categories,
such as violations of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See infra notes 103–04 and
accompanying text.
33. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
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so are constitutional claims asserted during postconviction review.34 The
Chapman test is applicable in both state and federal courts.35
Besides Chapman, there are two other prominent federal harmless error
tests that, while not binding on state courts, are influential and fairly
representative of their state law counterparts.36 One of them, originating in
Kotteakos v. United States,37 asks whether a reviewing court can “say, with
fair assurance, . . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the
error.”38 Federal courts use this test, rather than “the stricter Chapman . . .
measure of harmlessness,”39 with respect to most nonconstitutional claims40
and to constitutional claims raised during postconviction review.41 The other
leading federal harmless error test, from United States v. Olano,42 applies to
forfeited claims, calling for the “same kind of inquiry” as Kotteakos but “with
one important difference,” namely that “the defendant rather than the
Government . . . bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.”43
Stated differently, Olano requires the defense to establish “a reasonable
34. See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
35. While state courts are free to decide what the harmless error rule ought to be for errors
arising under state law, Chapman held that the harmless error test for constitutional errors is
a question of federal law. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21. The Court did not articulate a clear
explanation for this aspect of its holding, and scholars have offered a range of conflicting
theories. See, e.g., Daniel Epps, Harmless Errors and Substantial Rights, 131 HARV. L. REV.
2117, 2164–65 (2018) (defending Chapman’s imposition of a constitutional harmless error
test on state courts by conceptualizing its holding “as part and parcel of constitutional rights,
and not as part of the law of remedies”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional
Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 26 (1994) (arguing that there is “no firm basis for
understanding the Chapman decision as a constitutional mandate” and that “understanding
Chapman instead as constitutional common law seems to me the only plausible alternative”
(citing Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20–21, 21 n.112 (1975))).
36. Compare infra notes 37–44 and accompanying text (discussing the main federal
harmless error tests other than Chapman), with People v. Lightsey, 279 P.3d 1072, 1097 (Cal.
2012) (“Typically, a defendant who has established error under state law must demonstrate
there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he or she would have obtained
a more favorable result.”), and People v. Crimmins, 326 N.E.2d 787, 793–94 (N.Y. 1975)
(explaining that the harmless error test for nonconstitutional errors arising from a jury trial
asks, first, whether “proof of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the error, is
overwhelming,” and second, whether “even in the face of apparently conclusive proof of the
defendant’s guilt . . . there is a significant probability, rather than only a rational
possibility, . . . that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error”).
37. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
38. Id. at 765. The Kotteakos case construed the generally applicable federal harmless
error statute, which at that time was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 391 but has since been modestly
amended and recodified at 28 U.S.C. § 2111. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
39. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 438–39 (1995) (discussing “the stricter [from the
prosecution’s standpoint] Chapman, or the less strict Kotteakos, measure of harmlessness”).
40. See id. at 437–38.
41. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993).
42. 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (construing FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b)).
43. Id. at 734. To prevail with a forfeited claim under Olano, a defendant must establish
not only that error occurred and that the error was harmful but also that the error is “clear or
obvious” and “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (citing and quoting Olano,
507 U.S. at 736 (alteration in original)).
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probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”44
Each of these tests, and a multitude of others resembling them, reduce the
concept of harm to some likelihood of an adverse outcome. Some place the
burden on the prosecution to show that the error did not affect the outcome,
e.g., Chapman and Kotteakos, while others shift the burden to the defense to
prove otherwise, e.g., Olano.45 And each one demands a somewhat different
degree of probability—e.g., certainty “beyond a reasonable doubt,” as in
Chapman; a “fair assurance,” as in Kotteakos; or a “reasonable probability,”
as in Olano—regarding an error’s effect or lack of effect.46 But they are
fundamentally alike to the extent they all revolve around whether the
outcome in question—whether it be a guilty plea,47 a trial verdict,48 or a
sentence49—is attributable to error. This feature is the hallmark of the
conventional method of harmless error review.
B. Unorthodox Harmless Error Rules
There are not many harmless error tests that deviate from the outcomecentric prototype described in the last section.50 But there are some. This
44. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2004) (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality opinion))
(glossing Olano’s test for harmless error).
45. See supra notes 33, 37–38, 42–44 and accompanying text. There is some
disagreement about whether it is useful or even coherent to conceptualize harmless error
review in terms of burdens of production and persuasion. Compare Stephen A. Saltzburg, The
Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988, 1018 (1973) (“[T]he presumption confuses
rather than aids analysis.”), with Anne Bowen Poulin, Tests for Harm in Criminal Cases: A
Fix for Blurred Lines, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 991, 1008, 1044–45 (2015) (arguing that
assignment of the burden of proof is a “key variable” in harmless error jurisprudence since it
determines who prevails when the evidence establishing harm or harmlessness is too close to
call under the applicable test). Moreover, many believe that the distinctions among the various
outcome-centric tests for harmless error are too subtle to accomplish much. See, e.g., John M.
Greabe, The Riddle of Harmless Error Revisited, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 59, 99–100 (2016). But
see, e.g., TRAYNOR, supra note 25, at 44–45, 49–51 (arguing that the author’s proposed test,
which asks whether it is “highly probable” that the error affected the outcome, would
meaningfully constrain judicial discretion).
46. See supra notes 33, 37–38, 44 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 76 (holding that, for forfeited claims
alleging violation of federal plea colloquy rules, the harmless error test is whether there is “a
reasonable probability that, but for the error, [the defendant] would not have entered the plea”).
48. See, e.g., People v. Crimmins, 326 N.E.2d 787, 793–94 (N.Y. 1975); see supra note
36.
49. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 969 So. 2d 238, 241–43 (Fla. 2007) (holding that, for
nonconstitutional sentencing errors that were preserved below or raised within two years of
the sentence becoming final, the harmless error test is whether “the record conclusively shows
that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence using a correct scoresheet,” but for
forfeited claims raised past the two-year deadline, the test is whether “the trial court could
have imposed the same sentence using a correct scoresheet”).
50. In fact, the existing academic literature almost uniformly ignores non-outcome-centric
offshoots of the harmless error rule. See, e.g., 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 854 (4th ed. 2019) (“What Justice Rutledge wrote in Kotteakos
may well be all that can usefully be said of the [harmless error] rule.”); see supra notes 37–38
and accompanying text (discussing Kotteakos).
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section introduces two variants of the harmless error rule that broaden a
reviewing court’s inquiry beyond discerning an error’s effect or lack of effect
on the outcome below: the Supreme Court’s “special harmless error test,”
which applies when a trial judge whose impartiality is open to question fails
to recuse,51 and Michigan’s generally applicable harmless error rule for
preserved claims.52 These two examples do not exhaust the (rather small)
realm of unorthodox harmless error rules, but they merit close consideration
because each of them exhibits some key features of the approach I advance
later in this Article.
1. Liljeberg’s Harmless Error Test for Recusal Errors Implicating the
Appearance of Judicial Impartiality
The Supreme Court’s decision in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition
Corp.53 furnishes the harmless error test that federal courts look to when
reviewing violations of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which requires a federal judge to
“disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.”54 (Many state and territorial courts have also
adopted Liljeberg’s test with respect to comparable errors arising under their
own laws.)55 After finding that the trial judge ran afoul of § 455(a) by failing
to recuse himself despite having a conflict of interest,56 the Court examined
whether the plaintiff was entitled to a remedy under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.57 The Court commenced its analysis of that question by
51. Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745, 747 (D.C. 1989) (en banc) (adopting the test set
forth in Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988)); see also infra Part
I.B.1.
52. See infra Part I.B.2.
53. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). See generally Murray, supra note 11, at 1820–23 (discussing
Liljeberg).
55. See Heber v. Heber, 330 P.3d 926, 930 (Alaska 2014); State v. Salazar, 898 P.2d 982,
987 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Stevenson v. State, 782 A.2d 249, 258 (Del. 2001); Scott, 559 A.2d
at 747 (District of Columbia); Petzold v. Kessler Homes, Inc., 303 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Ky.
2010); Tierney v. Four H Land Co., 798 N.W.2d 586, 596 (Neb. 2011); State v. Shelton, 901
N.W.2d 741, 746 (S.D. 2017); Mosley v. State, 141 S.W.3d 816, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004);
Velardo v. Ovitt, 933 A.2d 227, 237 (Vt. 2007); Hodge v. McGowan, 50 V.I. 296, 311–12
(2008); Tatham v. Rogers, 283 P.3d 583, 598 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); cf. State v. Finch, 865
N.W.2d 696, 705 (Minn. 2015) (noting that it is ambiguous whether and to what extent
Minnesota has adopted the Liljeberg test). But see Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d
388, 391 (N.H. 1992) (rejecting Liljeberg and requiring automatic reversal for recusal errors
implicating the appearance of judicial impartiality). Other jurisdictions have yet to weigh in.
56. See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 858–61. The conflict of interest had to do with the trial
judge’s membership on the board of trustees of Loyola University New Orleans, which was
negotiating a real estate transaction with John Liljeberg Jr., the defendant, while trial court
proceedings were in progress. See id. at 850. According to the Court, “[t]he success and
benefit to Loyola of these negotiations turned, in large part, on Liljeberg prevailing in the
litigation.” Id.
57. Specifically, the plaintiff sought relief under Rule 60(b)(6), which, at the time,
provided that “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.” Id. at 863 n.10 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6)). Rule 60(b)(6) “grants federal
courts broad authority to relieve a party from a final judgment,” though the Supreme Court
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stating, “As in other areas of the law, there is surely room for harmless error
committed by busy judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying
circumstance. There need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of
§ 455(a).”58 It went on to announce the following test:
[I]n determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a violation of
§ 455(a), it is appropriate to consider [1] the risk of injustice to the parties
in the particular case, [2] the risk that the denial of relief will produce
injustice in other cases, and [3] the risk of undermining the public’s
confidence in the judicial process.59

The Court then analyzed each factor in reverse order. Beginning with the
third factor, the Court discussed a number of “facts that might reasonably
cause an objective observer to question [the judge’s] impartiality,” ultimately
concluding that “[t]he violation [of § 455(a)] is neither insubstantial nor
excusable.”60 As to the second factor, the Court stated that a “willingness to
enforce § 455 may prevent a substantive injustice in some future case by
encouraging a judge or litigant to more carefully examine possible grounds
for disqualification and to promptly disclose them when discovered.”61
Looping back to the first factor, the Court suggested that the trial court’s
disposition might well have been wrong on the merits,62 and, moreover, that
“neither Liljeberg nor Loyola University,” a third party with a stake in the
outcome, “has made a showing of special hardship by reason of their reliance
on the original judgment.”63 The Court thus concluded that the § 455(a)
violation warranted vacatur of the trial court’s judgment.64
Liljeberg’s tripartite test, which courts widely use in connection with
§ 455(a) violations and certain other recusal errors in both criminal and civil
cases,65 diverges from conventional harmless error review in several key
has “caution[ed] that it should only be applied in ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. at 863–
64 (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199–200 (1950)).
58. Id. at 862 (footnote omitted). The Court hastened to add: “It would be equally wrong,
however, to adopt an absolute prohibition against any relief in cases involving forgetful
judges.” Id.
59. Id. at 864.
60. Id. at 865–68.
61. Id. at 868.
62. The Court indicated that “a careful study of Judge Rubin’s analysis of the merits of
the underlying litigation suggests that there is a greater risk of unfairness in upholding the
judgment in favor of Liljeberg than there is in allowing a new judge to take a fresh look at the
issues.” Id. at 868. In a previous appeal, before the trial judge’s conflict of interest came to
light, the Fifth Circuit had held that the judge’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous,
but Judge Alvin Rubin dissented because in his view the facts plainly showed that
“‘Liljeberg’s chicanery’ gave rise to an estoppel as a matter of law.” Id. at 868 n.16 (quoting
Health Serv. Acquisition v. Liljeberg, 747 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1984) (unpublished table
decision) (Rubin, J., dissenting)).
63. Id. at 868–69. The Court also noted, apparently in connection with the first factor,
that “although a delay of 10 months after the affirmance by the Court of Appeals would
normally foreclose relief based on a violation of § 455(a), in this case the entire delay is
attributable to [the trial judge’s] inexcusable failure to disqualify himself.” Id. at 869.
64. Id. at 870.
65. See supra note 55. One judge has argued in a dissenting opinion that there is at least
a “substantial question” regarding whether the Liljeberg test is truly a species of harmless error
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respects. For one thing, it is forward-looking insofar as it directs courts to
consider whether “denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases.”66
Although Liljeberg’s discussion of this factor was admittedly a bit
perfunctory,67 subsequent cases indicate that it injects a prophylactic
ingredient into the remedial calculus that is wholly missing from outcomecentric harmless error review.68 Furthermore, the Liljeberg test is attentive
to the possibility that illegal conduct can cause serious harm—in the case of
§ 455(a) errors, by “undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial
process”69—even without influencing the outcome. Indeed, numerous cases
applying Liljeberg’s test have overturned judgments based on an appearance
of bias that might compromise public confidence in the judiciary while
assuming or even finding that the trial judge had no actual bias affecting the
outcome.70 And finally, Liljeberg implicitly calls for a balancing analysis
that weighs the benefits of reversal—rectifying any injustice to the
unsuccessful party, preventing injustice in future cases, and restoring public
confidence—against its costs.71 While outcome-centric harmless error rules
likewise reflect an effort to accommodate the competing goals of fairness and
finality, such rules do not invite a case-by-case balancing of interests as
Liljeberg does.72
2. Michigan’s Two-Step Approach to Harmless Error Review
Michigan’s harmless error doctrine also has some important
unconventional characteristics, at least with respect to preserved claims.73
Elaborating on the state’s vaguely worded statutes and court rules relating to
review—as opposed to a construction of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)—and
whether it extends to criminal cases. See United States v. O’Keefe, 169 F.3d 281, 285–89 (5th
Cir. 1999) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (questioning United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 892–
93 (5th Cir. 1997), in which a previous Fifth Circuit panel had applied the Liljeberg rule in
the same litigation). But every other court or judge to consider the issue in a published opinion
has concluded that Liljeberg’s three-factor test constitutes a form of harmless error review that
applies, if at all, in criminal cases to the same extent as in civil cases. See, e.g., United States
v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 777 (2d Cir. 2007).
66. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864 (emphasis added).
67. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745, 747 (D.C. 1989) (en banc); see also
infra notes 239, 242 (discussing cases applying Liljeberg’s second prong).
69. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864.
70. See, e.g., Belton v. United States, 581 A.2d 1205, 1214–15 (D.C. 1990).
71. See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864. Liljeberg did not expressly say that the three factors
it highlighted form a balancing test, but courts have correctly recognized that “by using a risk
analysis, [Liljeberg] allows the balancing of those objectives [favoring reversal] against the
potential burdens placed on the judicial system and the parties by re-opening a final
judgment.” E.g., Mosley v. State, 141 S.W.3d 816, 837–38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
72. See infra notes 281–83 and accompanying text.
73. For forfeited claims, Michigan follows the federal approach described in the previous
section. See People v. Carines, 597 N.W.2d 130, 138 (Mich. 1999) (stating that the harmless
error test in Michigan for forfeited claims, whether constitutional or nonconstitutional, tracks
the federal Olano rule). As discussed elsewhere, Olano requires the defense to establish,
among other things, a “reasonable probability” of outcome-determinative prejudice. Supra
notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
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harmless error,74 the Michigan Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in People v.
Robinson75 indicated that
[w]here it is claimed that error is harmless, two inquiries are pertinent.
First, is the error so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process
that it never can be regarded as harmless? Second, if not so basic, can we
declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?76

The second prong of this test, which underwent substantial revision in later
cases,77 is a form of traditional, outcome-centric harmless error review, so I
do not discuss it further here. But Robinson’s first step is distinctive. “Its
purpose,” according to the Michigan Court of Appeals, “is to deter
prosecutorial and police misconduct and to safeguard those individual rights
which are so fundamental that the impact of their violation cannot be fully
assessed.”78 In light of this purpose, “[a]n error may be intolerably offensive
to the maintenance of a sound judicial system,” warranting a new trial under
the first part of the Robinson test, “if it was deliberately injected into the
proceedings by the prosecutor” or if the prosecutor’s error was “flagrantly
negligent.”79
A series of Michigan Court of Appeals decisions, involving improper
commentary on a defendant’s silence at the time of arrest in violation of the
rule laid down in People v. Bobo,80 reveals the potential power of Robinson’s
approach to harmless error.81 The first case, People v. Swan,82 found a Bobo
error harmless largely because there was “ample evidence to destroy any
reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.”83 Yet the court in Swan
proceeded to “emphasize” that “[i]n finding the error harmless in this
74. See Elizabeth Price Foley & Robert M. Filiatrault, The Riddle of Harmless Error in
Michigan, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 423, 428–30 (2000) (comparing the language of four Michigan
harmless error rules found in statutes and court rules and concluding that “Michigan lawyers
and judges . . . are left to struggle over [the rules’] diaphanous words with virtually no
guidance as to their meaning”).
75. 194 N.W.2d 709 (Mich. 1972).
76. Id. at 713 (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Wichman, 166 N.W.2d 298, 302
(Mich. Ct. App. 1968)). The Michigan Supreme Court drew this passage from the
intermediate appellate court’s decision a few years earlier in People v. Wichman, which
appears to be the first case embracing this two-tiered approach to harmless error analysis.
77. See infra note 90.
78. E.g., People v. Swan, 223 N.W.2d 346, 351 n.6 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
79. People v. Gallon, 328 N.W.2d 615, 618 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Swan, 223
N.W.2d at 351). An error may also lead to reversal under Robinson’s first prong, even if it
did not involve deliberate or grossly negligent prosecutorial misconduct, “if it deprives the
defendant of a fundamental element of the adversary process, or if it is of a particularly
inflammatory or persuasive kind.” Swan, 223 N.W.2d at 351–52.
80. 212 N.W.2d 190 (Mich. 1973).
81. See id. at 191–92 (holding that “[w]here an accused exercises his constitutional right
to remain silent at the time of arrest, . . . the use of such silence against him at trial under the
doctrine of impeachment by prior inconsistent statement” generally violates the Fifth
Amendment); cf. People v. Cetlinski, 460 N.W.2d 534, 542 (Mich. 1990) (narrowing Bobo to
the extent it prohibits “the use of a defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda . . . omissions” and
“constru[ing] Bobo as being coextensive with the Fifth Amendment . . . and the due process
analysis of” Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)).
82. 223 N.W.2d 346 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
83. Id. at 352–53.
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case, . . . we do not condone [the prosecutor’s] conduct” and “in the
future . . . [d]eliberate violations of this rule may lead us to reverse
convictions even where evidence might be overwhelming. The prosecutor
who comments, or elicits comment, on a defendant’s silence thus risks the
loss of a perfectly good case for no reason.”84
These were not idle words, for in the years following Swan, the court often,
though not unflinchingly,85 relied on Robinson’s first prong to reverse in
cases where it determined that the Bobo rule had been violated. In one such
case, the court quoted Swan’s admonition and then reversed, explaining that
“[t]he prosecutor in this case has run the risk and lost” and that “[t]he only
way to stop deliberate violations of the rule in Bobo is to be unyielding in our
application of its prohibition.”86 In another, the court highlighted the fact
that the trial had taken place “a year after Swan and two years after Bobo,”
which, in conjunction with other circumstances, indicated that “the
prosecutor’s conduct was either deliberate or flagrantly negligent” and thus
that “such conduct [is] intolerably offensive to the maintenance of a sound
judicial process.”87 Further illustrations abound both with respect to Bobo
errors88 and in relation to other forms of prosecutorial misconduct.89
For reasons that are not entirely clear, Robinson’s analytical framework
has largely faded into the background of criminal litigation in Michigan
during the last two decades.90 The harmless error tests that Michigan courts
84. Id. at 353.
85. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 249 N.W.2d 343, 344 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976)
(acknowledging that ordinarily commenting on a defendant’s silence at arrest “would call for
a peremptory reversal” but holding that it was harmless where, in a prosecution for carrying a
concealed weapon, the defendant admitted through his testimony that he had possessed a gun
at the time of his arrest).
86. People v. Hoye, 263 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
87. People v. Norris, 253 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
88. See, e.g., People v. Gallon, 328 N.W.2d 615, 618–19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
89. See, e.g., People v. Green, 345 N.W.2d 676, 679–80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (per
curiam) (finding that where the prosecutor implied that the nontestifying defendant had an
obligation to explain the evidence against him, a maneuver the court deemed “obviously
considered and deliberate,” the error was “unduly offensive to the sound maintenance of the
judicial system”). The first step of Robinson has less bite in connection with errors attributable
to the trial judge than it does for those involving prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., People
v. Minor, 541 N.W.2d 576, 580–81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that evidentiary error was
not “deliberately injected into the proceedings by the prosecution” and thus did not require
reversal under Robinson’s first prong because it “was error by the court”).
90. See People v. Mitchell, 586 N.W.2d 119, 121 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam)
(noting that, although “[i]t was long held that two inquiries were pertinent to the issue whether
a trial court error was harmless,” referencing Robinson, “the determination of harmless error
is now governed by statute, by court rule, and by recent pronouncements by our Supreme
Court”). A trilogy of cases from the 1990s—People v. Mateo, People v. Gearns, and People
v. Lukity—appears to have played a significant role in sidelining Robinson. Robinson’s second
prong—the prong not emphasized in this section, as it embodies a conventional approach to
harmless error analysis—in effect extended the Supreme Court’s Chapman test not only to
constitutional errors, as Chapman requires, but also to nonconstitutional errors, which
Chapman does not mandate. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text; supra text
accompanying note 77 (discussing Robinson and its second prong); supra notes 31–35 and
accompanying text (discussing Chapman). The Michigan Supreme Court rejected this aspect
of Robinson in Mateo, 551 N.W.2d 891 (Mich. 1996), holding that Chapman should no longer
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recite and apply in most cases nowadays are entirely outcome-centric, and in
some respects, Michigan’s modern harmless error doctrine is actually less
protective of criminal defendants’ procedural rights than the rules in force
elsewhere.91 That said, Michigan’s courts have not expressly rejected the
principle that some errors, because of their deliberateness or flagrancy, are
“so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process” as to require
reversal on deterrence grounds without any showing of outcomedeterminative prejudice.92 Indeed, courts in Michigan still continue to give
this concept an occasional nod.93
C. Reversal Outside the Harmless Error Framework
There are some exceptional situations in which a reviewing court may
reverse due to procedural error without conducting any form of harmless
error review, either because an automatic reversal rule is applicable or
because a court sees fit to exercise its inherent supervisory power to reverse.
While these exceptions offer a small measure of respite from the rigors of
harmless error review, they operate “only in a ‘very limited class of cases’”94
and have limited overall impact.
Automatic reversal rules have a categorical sweep: they exempt entire
classes of procedural claims from harmless error review, at least if the claims
were preserved below.95 For instance, automatic reversal is required for total
deprivation of the right to counsel, trials conducted by a potentially biased
judge,96 discrimination during selection of the grand jury or petit jury,
infractions of the right to a public trial, violation of the right of selfcover preserved nonconstitutional claims and asserting that “the articulation of the harmlesserror test in Robinson was dicta.” Id. at 896 & n.13. While Mateo left open what test should
take the place of Chapman (i.e., Robinson’s second step) in the context of preserved
nonconstitutional claims, the court took up that issue in Gearns, 577 N.W.2d 422 (Mich.
1998), overruled by People v. Lukity, 596 N.W.2d 607 (Mich. 1999), holding that a reviewing
court should reverse unless “it is highly probable that the [error] did not contribute to the
verdict,” id. at 438, a relatively defense-friendly rule as far as outcome-centric harmless error
rules go, albeit less so than Chapman. But the very next year, in Lukity, 596 N.W.2d 607, the
court overruled Gearns and held that a reviewing court should affirm unless “it is more
probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted without the error,” id. at 612–
13, yielding one of the least rights-protective harmless error standards used anywhere in the
country for preserved nonconstitutional claims raised on direct appeal.
91. See supra note 90.
92. People v. Robinson, 194 N.W.2d 709, 713 (Mich. 1972) (quoting People v. Wichman,
166 N.W.2d 298, 302 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968)).
93. See, e.g., People v. Shorter, 922 N.W.2d 628, 635 n.7 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).
94. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520
U.S. 461, 468 (1997)) (referring to automatic reversal rules for constitutional errors). With
respect to the supervisory power, see, for example, Kamin, supra note 12, at 77–78 (explaining
that the Supreme Court has “essentially eliminate[d] the supervisory power” as a basis for
reversal in the federal system); see also infra notes 95–116 (discussing the narrowness of both
types of harmless error exceptions).
95. Automatic reversal rules do not necessarily extend to forfeited claims. See, e.g.,
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 140–41 (2009).
96. By contrast, Liljeberg’s harmless error test, discussed in Part I.B.1, supra, applies in
federal courts and some state courts when a judge’s conduct creates an appearance of bias but
does not evince actual bias. See, e.g., In re Bergeron, 636 F.3d 882, 883–84 (7th Cir. 2011).
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representation, and more.97 The reasons courts have articulated to justify
automatic reversal “var[y] in a significant way from error to error,” but
“[t]here appear to be at least three broad rationales”: (1) “the right at issue is
not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead
protects some other interest,” (2) “the effects of the error [on the outcome]
are simply too hard to measure,” and (3) “the error always results in
fundamental unfairness.”98
Ever since the Supreme Court subjected constitutional errors to harmless
error review in its 1967 Chapman decision,99 scholars have been pushing
courts to expand the list of errors that give rise to automatic reversal,100 with
some arguing that Chapman should be overruled altogether.101 Instead,
courts have done just the opposite. Troubled that automatic reversal may
sometimes cause “the reversal of criminal convictions obtained pursuant to a
fair trial,”102 courts have embraced a “strong presumption” against making
blanket exceptions to the harmless error rule.103 And courts often circumvent
what few automatic reversal rules they have recognized by narrowing the
scope of the procedural rights that automatic reversal is meant to protect—
holding, for instance, that certain partial or temporary courtroom closures,
though improper, are “too trivial” to violate the right to a public trial and thus
do not require automatic reversal.104 The idea of employing automatic
97. See generally 7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.6(d) (4th ed.
2015) (summarizing case law on automatic reversal).
98. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017). In Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279 (1991), the Supreme Court attempted to rationalize its automatic reversal
jurisprudence by distinguishing between “trial error[s]” and “structural defects,” suggesting
that the former are covered by the harmless error rule whereas the latter are not. Id. at 307–
10. These labels are not helpful. The Court “has endorsed several ‘different and largely
inconsistent’ interpretations of the trial/structural-error dichotomy, each ambiguous in its own
right and unable to explain which errors the Court has subjected to harmless error review and
which it has not.” Murray, supra note 11, at 1807–08 (footnote omitted) (quoting David
McCord, The “Trial”/”Structural” Error Dichotomy: Erroneous, and Not Harmless, 45 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1412 (1997)).
99. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text (discussing Chapman).
100. See, e.g., Philip J. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of
Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519, 556–57 (1969) (suggesting that “application of
a rule of automatic reversal to all constitutional errors” might be ideal but that, since Chapman
foreclosed that option, there should at least be “a general rule of automatic reversal” for
constitutional errors subject to some discrete exceptions).
101. See, e.g., David R. Dow & James Rytting, Can Constitutional Error Be Harmless?,
2000 UTAH L. REV. 483. Other commentators have come out against automatic reversal,
whether for constitutional errors or otherwise. See, e.g., Steven M. Shepard, Note, The Case
Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Errors, 117 YALE L.J. 1180 (2008).
102. Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1138 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
103. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). In what may well be the Court’s most
controversial foray into the harmless error domain—aside from Chapman itself—Fulminante
held that the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession is subject to harmless error
review, rejecting the long-standing rule of automatic reversal that had previously applied to
such errors. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308–12. This holding has provoked extensive
criticism. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying
Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152 (1991).
104. See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1996). See generally Daryl J.
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 889
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reversal as a broad-based strategy for addressing the harmless error rule’s
shortcomings has thus largely led to a dead end.
Even when no automatic reversal rule applies, reviewing courts sometimes
invoke their inherent supervisory power to reverse outside the usual harmless
error framework.105 As an example, in State v. Payne,106 the Connecticut
Supreme Court considered “whether, in the exercise of our supervisory
authority over the administration of justice, the defendant should be afforded
a new trial because of pervasive prosecutorial misconduct.”107 During his
closing argument in a felony murder trial,108 the prosecutor relied on facts
not in evidence to vouch for one of his witnesses, accused the defendant of
taking part in an uncharged robbery without any evidence, impeached the
defendant’s credibility by speculating about the severity of the sentence he
would receive if convicted, and urged the jury to convict out of sympathy for
the victim and his family.109 The court found not only that these remarks
were improper but also that the improprieties were “serious and deliberate”
and “part of a pattern of misconduct by this prosecutor.”110 The court then
“balance[d] society’s interest in maintaining a justice system that treats all
defendants fairly and appears to do so, against some of the difficulties that
might arise in a new trial,”111 concluding that reversal was appropriate
because “the prosecutor in this case repeatedly committed serious

(1999) (arguing that “raising the ‘price’ of a constitutional violation by enhancing the remedy
will, all things being equal, result in fewer violations”—a phenomenon the author calls
“remedial deterrence”—and that “[t]he primary method available to courts for lowering the
number of violations is to pare back the constitutional right”).
105. Courts can also exercise their supervisory power to announce automatic reversal rules,
blending the two techniques for avoiding harmless error review examined in this section. See,
e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 809–14, 809 n.21 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (invoking the Court’s supervisory power to require automatic reversal
where a federal court appoints a private litigant’s attorney to prosecute a criminal contempt
charge against that litigant’s adversary). More commonly, though, the supervisory power is
used to reverse on case-specific rather than categorical grounds, as occurred in State v. Payne,
797 A.2d 1088 (Conn. 2002), discussed below.
106. 797 A.2d 1088 (Conn. 2002).
107. Id. at 1090. The court explained that “an appellate court may invoke its supervisory
authority to reverse a criminal conviction when the prosecutor deliberately engages in conduct
that he or she knows, or ought to know, is improper” or “when there has been a pattern of
misconduct across trials, not just within an individual trial.” Id. at 1092–93 (citing and quoting
State v. Pouncey, 699 A.2d 901, 906, 908 (Conn. 1997)). The court added, however, that even
when it finds prosecutorial misconduct, it will “generally balance the seriousness of the
infraction against the difficulties that might arise in a new trial,” weighing a range of factors
that include
the extent of prejudice to the defendant; the emotional trauma to the victims or
others likely to result from reliving their experiences at a new trial; the practical
problems of memory loss and unavailability of witnesses after much time has
elapsed; and the availability of other sanctions for such misconduct.
Id. at 1093 (quoting State v. Ruiz, 521 A.2d 1025, 1033 (Conn. 1987)).
108. See id. at 1090–91.
109. See id. at 1094–99.
110. Id. at 1099.
111. Id.
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prosecutorial misconduct and our experience counsels that nothing short of
reversal will deter similar misconduct in the future.”112
But cases that rely on a reviewing court’s supervisory power to reverse are
a vanishing breed.113 The Supreme Court has almost completely dismantled
the prerogative of federal courts to reverse or to provide comparable
remedies, such as dismissal of an indictment, on supervisory power grounds,
casting such remedies as illegitimate attempts to “circumvent” the harmless
error rule.114 State courts are not obliged to follow the Supreme Court’s lead
on this matter, and some of them have displayed greater willingness to
exercise their supervisory power to reverse as a means of deterring future
violations of procedural law.115 Yet many states subscribe to the federal
approach or something closely approximating it, holding, in the words of one
court, that “[t]he supervisory power of the appellate court to reverse a
conviction is inappropriate as a remedy when the error is harmless.”116
II. ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL
The harmless error rule, as I have shown, is a nearly pervasive feature of
criminal appellate and postconviction litigation that, in its conventional form,
directs reviewing courts to overlook legal errors that did not affect the
outcome below. This part contends that the conventional approach to
harmless error review fosters a dangerous level of disregard for procedural
law in the lower criminal courts.

112. Id. at 1100.
113. Indeed, the tide has turned against the supervisory power in a wide range of doctrinal
settings. See Bruce A. Green, Federal Courts’ Supervisory Authority in Federal Criminal
Cases: The Warren Court Revolution That Might Have Been, 49 STETSON L. REV. 241, 258–
61 (2020) (documenting this trend in the federal system). This is partly because the very
notion of an inherent judicial authority to maintain standards of justice that cannot be traced
to a specific grant of power invites questions about legitimacy and separation of powers.
Compare Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1433, 1520–21 (1984) (questioning the legitimacy of some decisions grounded in inherent
supervisory power and arguing that “the term supervisory power should be abandoned”), with
Monaghan, supra note 35, at 39–40 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s foundational
supervisory power cases can be “rationalized” as “constitutional common law”).
114. See Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 253–55 (1988) (holding that
dismissal was improper absent a showing of prejudice, as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
52 “is, in every pertinent respect, as binding as any statute duly enacted by Congress” and thus
“[t]he balance struck by the Rule between societal costs and the rights of the accused may not
casually be overlooked ‘because a court has elected to analyze the question under the
supervisory power’” (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736 (1980))); see also
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (holding that “the harmless-error rule of
Chapman . . . may not be avoided by an assertion of supervisory power, simply to justify a
reversal of these criminal convictions”).
115. Payne is one case in point. See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text; see also,
e.g., State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 846–50 (Minn. 2012).
116. State v. Murray, 443 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 1984) (“We agree with the recent analysis
of the Court in [Hasting].”). See generally State v. Sherman, 378 P.3d 1060, 1077 (Kan. 2016)
(“The majority view [among state courts] . . . is that supervisory powers are not sufficiently
omnipotent to permit the reversal of an otherwise constitutionally sound conviction.”).
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My case for this conclusion centers on two points.117 First and foremost,
outcome-centric harmless error review seriously diminishes the incentives of
trial judges, prosecutors, and relevant organizational and systemic entities to
abide by procedural law. Legal violations spring from a variety of causes,
not just from deliberate attempts to influence the outcome, and many are
unlikely to cause outcome-determinative prejudice. Conventional harmless
error review creates impunity for the judges, prosecutors, and others that bear
responsibility for the host of errors that, while not outcome altering,
nevertheless degrade the quality of justice emerging from the criminal
process. And even with respect to violations of the law that were in fact
designed to hand an undeserved win to the prosecution, reviewing courts lack
reliable tools to detect when an error has swayed the outcome. Insofar as
trial judges, prosecutors, and others are inclined to break the law as a means
of giving the prosecution a leg up, they might well calculate that the risk of
getting caught is slim enough to make cheating a safe bet.
Second, putting incentives to the side, trial judges, prosecutors, and other
entities depend on reviewing courts to clarify what the law requires from
them so they can conform their conduct to its strictures. But outcome-centric
harmless error review stymies the vital process of norm clarification, since
reviewing courts frequently use it to avoid confronting novel questions of
procedural law. They do so by disposing of defense claims on harmless error
grounds without ever deciding whether the allegedly erroneous conduct was
illegal in the first place. As the question posed by conventional harmless
error rules—did the error affect the outcome—generally has no logical
relationship to the question of whether the law was violated below,118 these
dispositions deprive trial judges and other entities of guidance regarding how
they should handle similar scenarios that may arise in future cases.
A. Unaccountability
Dissenting from his colleagues’ decision to affirm a criminal conviction
despite prosecutorial misconduct in United States v. Antonelli Fireworks
Co.,119 Judge Jerome Frank sensed a troubling pattern was emerging.120 In
a string of opinions, the Second Circuit had “used vigorous language in
117. As discussed above, there are additional reasons to worry about conventional harmless
error rules—having to do with their tendency to unfairly deny redress in individual cases—
beyond the two concerns outlined here. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. On the
other hand, as explored in Part III.C, infra, reversal is a costly remedial tool that should not be
ordered lightly and, moreover, some form of harmless error review is essential to a wellfunctioning criminal justice system.
118. This claim is qualified to some degree for the small but important subset of procedural
rules that I refer to as prejudice-based rights. See infra note 214.
119. 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946).
120. The trial, which took place during World War II, centered on allegations that the
defendants had manufactured defective war materials and conspired to defraud the federal
government in its war effort. See id. at 633. The prosecutor wrapped up his closing argument
with an appeal to the jurors’ sense of patriotic duty during wartime. See id. at 637. The court
concluded that, “[t]hough the remarks were ill advised and overzealous, they seem
insignificant when properly considered in their setting.” Id. at 638.
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denouncing government counsel” for misconduct,121 yet it affirmed the
judgment below each time, often relying on the harmless error rule.122 As
Judge Frank saw things, “a reversal in a case like this might well serve as a
deterrent” and “make [the prosecutor] subsequently live up to professional
standards of courtroom decency.”123 But, Judge Frank wrote, if the court
continued to “merely go through the form of expressing displeasure” without
penalizing the offending prosecutors by “depriv[ing] them of their victories,”
its condemnations would accomplish little, for “[g]overnment counsel,
employing such tactics, are the kind who, eager to win victories, will gladly
pay the small price of a ritualistic verbal spanking.”124 Reviewing court
judges have voiced a concern akin to Judge Frank’s many other times and
places, revealing a fairly widespread perception that prosecutors and
sometimes even trial judges “are conducting criminal cases with an eye to
the saving grace of the” harmless error rule.125
Is this perception accurate? And if so, what lies behind it? There is some
debate in the academic literature as to whether judges, prosecutors, and other
relevant entities are responsive to the threat of reversal.126 To the extent their
incentives to follow or flout the law are independent of the risk of reversal,
the harmless error rule will have a limited impact on what transpires in the
lower criminal courts. Furthermore, some have argued—though here, too,
there is controversy—that conventional harmless error rules adequately deter
violations of the law because, by requiring reversal when illegal conduct has
121. Id. at 661 (Frank, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 656–57.
123. Id. at 661–62.
124. Id. at 661. Judge Frank even upped the ante a few chips further, asserting that “[i]f
we continue to do nothing practical to prevent such conduct, we should cease to disapprove
it” or else prosecutors will learn to treat the court’s rules regulating their behavior as “pretendrules.” Id.
125. People v. Black, 238 P. 374, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1925) (“It seems evident that the
prosecutors of the state, and possibly that the trial judges, are conducting criminal cases with
an eye to the saving grace of the [state constitution’s harmless error provision].”); see also,
e.g., United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 691–92 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[This Court’s] rebukes
seem to have little effect, no doubt because of the harmless error rule, which in this as in many
other cases precludes an effective remedy for prosecutorial misconduct.”); State v. Rodriguez,
254 S.W.3d 361, 373 (Tenn. 2008) (“[W]hen the rules of evidence and procedure stand
unenforced through a finding of harmless error, there is no deterrence that would encourage
future adherence to the rule. The absence of deterrence may ‘tacitly inform[] prosecutors that
they can weigh the commission of evidentiary or procedural violations . . . against an
increasingly accurate prediction that the appellate courts will ignore the misconduct when
sufficient evidence exists to prove the defendant’s guilt.’” (second and third alterations in
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT.
L. REV. 393, 425 (1992))); Jones v. State, 735 P.2d 699, 703 (Wyo. 1987) (Urbigkit, J.,
dissenting) (“Prosecutorial overreaching will only be discontinued when the detriment in case
reversals exceeds the benefit in excused convictions. The evidentiary tactic of using bad-acts
and bad-actor evidence for proof of guilt has continued unreasonably, despite adverse
comment by this court. The ‘do better next time’ admonition seldom deters future conduct.”).
In one especially poignant illustration, the appellate prosecutor in State v. Neidigh, 895 P.2d
423 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995), effectively admitted that the court’s liberal use of the harmless
error rule was influencing the behavior of trial prosecutors, prompting some stern words from
the court followed by yet another affirmance on harmless error grounds. See id. at 427–29.
126. See infra notes 128–39 and accompanying text.
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contributed to the outcome, such rules counteract any incentive that judges
or prosecutors may have to sink the defendant’s prospects through legal
error.127 In this section, I contend that reversal has the potential to serve as
an effective deterrent but that outcome-centric harmless error review
hampers that potential, liberating trial judges, prosecutors, and other entities
to violate procedural law with a fair assurance of impunity.
1. Reversal as a Prophylactic Tool
Let us begin by examining how reversal interacts with the incentive
structure of individual trial judges. Even without a threat of reversal looming
overhead, it seems fair to assume that many judges are at least minimally
self-motivated to abide by legal norms to the extent that the law is integral to
their professional identity and is the source of their legitimacy.128 Yet trial
judges sometimes violate the law inadvertently, either out of negligence—
for instance, a judge who overvalues leisure might fail to conduct an adequate
level of legal research—or because the controlling legal principles are so
opaque that even a diligent judge might not be able to discern them.129
Moreover, not all judicial errors are wholly inadvertent. Judges, like other
people, are driven by a variety of goals that can tug them in disparate
directions—at times in a direction opposed to the law.130 Broadly speaking,
a credible prospect of reversal induces trial judges to comply with the law,
both by disincentivizing intentional errors and encouraging negligence-prone
judges to exert a greater level of diligence to avoid error.131 As a reversal
can, depending on the situation, impose reputational costs, engender shame,
generate extra work by sending the case back for a whole or partial redo, or
interfere with a judge’s ideological objectives, “there are good reasons to
expect that district judges . . . react to reversals.”132
127. See supra note 12.
128. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial
Hierarchy, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 572–75 (2011). That said, not all judges possess a strong
role-based affinity for following the law. See, e.g., Nigel J. Cohen, Nonlawyer Judges and the
Professionalization of Justice: Should an Endangered Species Be Preserved?, 17 J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 19, 30–32 (2001).
129. See infra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 152, 159 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 379, 408–10 (1995) (arguing that a risk of reversal will induce trial judges to
increase their level of effort). Because the prosecution lacks the right to appeal acquittals and
most other adverse rulings, a strong risk of pro-defendant reversal might even prompt trial
judges to err in favor of criminal defendants when confronted with close legal questions. See,
e.g., Stith, supra note 12, at 36–42.
132. Joseph L. Smith, Patterns and Consequences of Judicial Reversals: Theoretical
Considerations and Data from a District Court, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 28, 31–33 (2006) (discussing
the “psychological, social, and policy-related costs” of reversal that may affect trial judges).
But see, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 404–08 (2007)
(questioning the efficacy of reversal’s potential deterrent mechanisms as to judges). While
some studies have found that intermediate appellate judges do not alter their behavior when
the likelihood of reversal by an apex court increases, see, e.g., David E. Klein & Robert J.
Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 579, 594–600 (2003), the bulk of the admittedly limited available data suggests that trial
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The same is true of prosecutors.133 Reversal can diminish a prosecutor’s
standing among colleagues or within the broader legal community, perhaps
jeopardizing their prospects for securing a promotion or outside
employment.134 It potentially burdens a prosecutor with the hassle of
relitigating a formerly closed case.135 And to the extent a prosecutor cares
about preserving trial-level victories, whether out of a sense of justice or
otherwise, that prosecutor will not relish seeing those victories spoiled.136
These costs are not equally present in every case: reversal seems to have
little negative impact on the reputation of prosecutors in certain
circumstances;137 the labor resulting from remand proceedings may wind up
falling on someone else’s shoulders in the event that the offending prosecutor
has retired or is otherwise out of the picture;138 and some prosecutors, though
eager to rack up wins in the trial courts where they practice, might have little
interest in what transpires after that point.139 But given the variety of
plausible deterrent mechanisms that may be operative in any particular case,
the threat of reversal—if credible—seems likely to have a significant
disciplinary effect for many prosecutors.
It would be a mistake, though, to evaluate reversal’s potential efficacy in
deterring illegal conduct solely by looking at its immediate impact on the
incentives of individual trial judges and prosecutors, as reversal can also
serve as a collective sanction. Daryl Levinson defines collective sanctions
as punishments that “are threatened against or imposed on groups of two or

judges do seek to avoid reversal, see Christina L. Boyd, The Hierarchical Influence of Courts
of Appeals on District Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 115–16 (2015) (reviewing relevant
literature).
133. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 176. But see, e.g., Alexandra White
Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving Prosecutor: Deterrence
Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 92–96 (2005)
(arguing that reversal cannot deter prosecutorial misconduct significantly or efficiently). To
my knowledge, there are no empirical studies examining the extent to which reversal
influences prosecutorial behavior, as there are for judicial behavior; this may be a fruitful area
for future research. There is, however, a burgeoning literature that explores other aspects of
prosecutors’ motivations and incentive structures. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright & Kay L.
Levine, Career Motivations of State Prosecutors, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1667 (2018).
134. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Mental Culpability and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 26
AM. J. CRIM. L. 121, 139–40 (1998).
135. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial
Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629, 647 (1972).
136. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 900 (1995).
137. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030,
2119–29 (2000) (making this point in the context of death penalty reversals). The reputational
costs associated with reversal will be less pronounced when the reviewing court’s opinion
omits the prosecutor’s name, as routinely happens. See infra note 243.
138. See, e.g., Bidish Sarma, Using Deterrence Theory to Promote Prosecutorial
Accountability, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 573, 605–06 (2017).
139. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liability for Supervising
Prosecutors: Applying the Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 395, 408 (2009).
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more individuals.”140 From a regulatory standpoint, as opposed to a moral
or retributive one, the “basic functional mechanism of collective sanctions”
involves “deterring wrongdoers indirectly by delegating enforcement
authority to some third-party or -parties who are well situated to monitor and
control them.”141 Using collective sanctions to induce a group to selfregulate may prove more fruitful than individualized sanctions when
sanctions imposed on an individual after a wrong is committed (i.e., ex post
sanctions) are unlikely to work and a group is better positioned than an
“external sanctioner” (for our purposes, a reviewing court) to regulate the
conduct of its members ex ante142 or when the panoply of sanctions a group
can impose on its members ex post is more effective (perhaps because they
are quicker, more certain, or more versatile) than the sanctions the external
sanctioner can levy against individual wrongdoers.143 Collective sanctions
also carry risks: groups sometimes react “by hiding wrongdoing from the
[external] sanctioner rather than by preventing it,” and they may attempt to
“undermine the sanctioner in the hope of destroying his capacity to
administer punishment.”144 These dangers are not always salient, however,
and the regulatory benefits of collective sanctions at times will outweigh
them.
Reversal functions like a collective sanction insofar as it generates
disutility not just for individual judges or prosecutors but also for
courthouses, prosecutors’ offices, and the state as a whole.145 Revealingly,
140. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 376–77 (2003).
Levinson’s definition covers collective “punishments or rewards,” id. at 376 (emphasis
added), but this Article is concerned with only the first half of this definition, as my point has
to do with a form of punishment (reversal) rather than a reward.
141. Id. at 362.
142. Id. at 381. As Levinson elaborates, “ex post liability will be ineffectual and ex ante
regulation may be preferable” if wrongdoers “will fail to internalize monetary costs above the
level of their ability to pay” or if they “lack the capacity to behave properly, either because
they lack knowledge about what optimal behavior entails or because optimal risk-reduction
strategies are structural and cannot be effected by individuals acting alone.” Id. (citing Steven
Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 358–64
(1984)).
143. See id. at 381, 383–85. Another potential justification for collective sanctions is that
“the outside sanctioner cannot cost-effectively narrow down the identity of the wrongdoer any
further.” Id. at 379. But this rationale has only limited relevance in the context of reversal for
procedural errors. The identity of the judge or prosecutor who is responsible for the error is
usually clear from the trial court record or else it can often be uncovered through fact-finding
during postconviction review. There are exceptions, as when a multimember prosecution team
comprising police and prosecutors does not turn over exculpatory evidence that is subject to
disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the reviewing court cannot
ascertain which team members, if any, knew of the evidence, grasped its significance, and
chose to suppress it. The constructive knowledge doctrine, which generally imputes the
knowledge of team members to each prosecutor for Brady purposes, is meant to address this
problem, though the doctrine has significant limits. See Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot:
Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution
Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 754–57 (2015).
144. Levinson, supra note 140, at 390.
145. Cf. Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance: A Counter-Narrative of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1608 (2015) (arguing that the rules comprising
constitutional criminal procedure should not be conceptualized merely as “regulations for the
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the main reason why many think that reversal is weak or inefficient as an
individualized sanction is that much of its cost may be borne by people other
than the wrongdoer (such as a new judge who is assigned to handle remand
proceedings), state entities (such as a district attorney’s office that may have
to relitigate the case and manage public relations), or the broader community
(especially if the crime is serious and there is little reason to doubt the
defendant’s guilt).146 While this point is a strong one, the logic of collective
sanctions indicates that it is double-edged.
To the extent reversal is costly for groups other than the particular judges
or prosecutors who violated the law, it may induce those groups to generate
their own, potentially superior mechanisms for preventing or, after the fact,
sanctioning judicial and prosecutorial errors. A realistic prospect of reversal
for judicial errors, for instance, could spur chief judges or other courthouse
administrators to formulate local rules or other internal practices aimed at
rooting out recurring forms of illegal conduct.147 Likewise, a string of
reversals stemming from prosecutorial error might prompt a chief prosecutor
to allocate additional resources to training new attorneys on their legal
obligations or to fire line prosecutors or supervising attorneys who have
displayed a persistent disregard for the law.148 Or perhaps not—reversal, like
other collective sanctions, could instead elicit undesirable responses, such as
a greater investment in secrecy so as to evade detection or open attacks on
the legitimacy of the sanctioner (i.e., the reviewing court).149 But if these
risks are managed appropriately,150 reversal’s capacity to stimulate groupbased self-regulation should generally help reinforce the more direct

police” but “as restricting the state as a whole,” where “the state . . . should be understood as
a complex set of actors and institutions interacting with one another”). Reviewing courts are
also arms of the state, of course. But it is a basic feature of American constitutional
governance that the state itself must act within the law and that courts play a key role in
articulating and policing the law’s boundaries.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1184 (2d Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
(“Reversal is an ill-suited remedy for prosecutorial misconduct; it does not affect the
prosecutor directly, but rather imposes upon society the cost of retrying an individual who was
fairly convicted.”).
147. Criminal procedure scholarship has traditionally not paid much attention to how
courthouse-wide policies and practices impact the level of compliance with procedural law in
individual judges’ courtrooms, though this is starting to change. See Elizabeth NevinsSaunders, Judicial Drift, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 331, 368 (2020) (highlighting “a gap when it
comes to scholarship about how [criminal] courts act as administrative bureaucracies” and
arguing that judges “function as administrators not just as they issue opinions in individual
cases, but also as they set (or fail to set) internal, court-wide policies and rules, which in turn
affect due process norms in individual cases”).
148. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2105–12 (2010) (urging prosecutors’ offices to formulate internal
policies and practices geared toward preventing and penalizing legal errors by staff
prosecutors).
149. See generally supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing potential hydraulic
reactions to collective sanctions).
150. This Article’s proposal reduces, without wholly eliminating, the risk of blowback by
calling on reviewing courts to account for the social cost of reversal through a balancing test.
See infra Part III.C.
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incentives it creates for individual trial judges and prosecutors to act within
the bounds set by law.
2. Harmless Error and Accountability in the Lower Criminal Courts
Up to this point, I have argued that reversal theoretically could be a
valuable tool for deterring violations of procedural law in the lower criminal
courts. The next stage of the argument, however, aims to show that reversal’s
theoretical potential as a prophylactic is compromised by the harmless error
rule—more specifically, by conventional harmless error rules that equate
harm with outcome-determinative prejudice. Some commentators have
concluded otherwise, reasoning that outcome-centric harmless error rules
should yield a tolerable level of deterrence by neutralizing whatever
incentive may exist to violate the law as a means of helping the prosecution
win.151 In my view, however, that conclusion is premised on an unduly
narrow understanding of the causes that contribute to judicial and
prosecutorial error as well as misplaced faith in the capacity of reviewing
courts to determine when an error has had an influence on the outcome.
While there surely are times when a prosecutor or even a judge deliberately
violates the law in an effort to rig the outcome,152 that does not seem to be
the reason why most procedural errors occur. Widespread systemic
deficiencies, such as oversized caseloads,153 inadequate training,154 and the
absence of vigorous adversarial contestation due to disinvestment in public
defense155 predictably lead to legal error even when individual trial judges
and prosecutors strive to do their best under trying circumstances. Judges
and prosecutors are also bound to make inadvertent mistakes in unsettled
areas of law simply because it is too difficult to figure out ex ante what the

151. See, e.g., Stith, supra note 12, at 43–48. But see, e.g., Kamin, supra note 12, at 72–
75 (arguing that the Chapman harmless error rule is not up to the task of deterring prosecutorial
misconduct but should suffice as to judicial errors).
152. See, e.g., Julia Simon-Kerr, Systemic Lying, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2175, 2202–08
(2015) (documenting evidence of judicial complicity in the widespread practice of police
“testilying” during Fourth Amendment suppression hearings, which points to “the willingness
of judges to subvert the law in criminal cases in order to thwart application of the exclusionary
rule” (quoting Paul Butler, When Judges Lie (and When They Should), 91 MINN. L. REV. 1785,
1796 (2007))).
153. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 282–
85 (2011) (arguing that heavy caseloads are a risk factor for Brady violations).
154. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 148, at 2105–08 (arguing that poor training is a risk
factor for prosecutorial misconduct).
155. As William Stuntz has explained, “the law of criminal procedure establishes a detailed
regulatory system” for judicial, prosecutorial, and police conduct that “depends for its
enforcement on criminal defense counsel,” but “[c]riminal procedure’s regulatory system
is . . . incomplete” insofar as it “leaves the level of defense litigation . . . basically
unregulated.” William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 19–21 (1997). As a result, “funding for criminal defense
is very low in absolute terms,” and “public defenders in many jurisdictions must cope with
mind-boggling caseloads.” Id. at 55.
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governing legal rule requires.156 Moreover, judges and prosecutors
sometimes violate the law without intent by, for example, skimping on
necessary legal research157 or falling prey to cognitive biases.158 And even
for violations that are more or less intentional, a judge’s or prosecutor’s
underlying incentives—or the incentives of relevant groups or systems—may
at times have more to do with conserving scarce resources than with putting
a thumb on the scale.159
Needless to say, it is possible that a procedural error not intended to tamper
with the outcome will nevertheless have that effect. When this happens,
conventional harmless error rules should in theory mandate reversal and
thereby deter future violations.160 Many errors, however, have little or no
potential to alter the outcome. Most prosecutorial errors at the grand jury
stage, for example, are exceedingly unlikely to influence the outcome of a
subsequent trial.161 If such errors are not discovered until after trial, a
reviewing court conducting outcome-centric harmless error review will

156. See, e.g., Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 GA. L. REV. 309, 320
(2015) (identifying “the fine line between proper argument and prosecutorial trial misconduct”
as a major source of error by prosecutors). Even when the law’s boundaries are hazy, error
often can be avoided—or pro-defense error can be substituted for pro-prosecution error—if
judges and prosecutors defer to the defense when confronting debatable legal issues. But this
strategy for preventing pro-prosecution error under conditions of uncertainty carries obvious
costs of its own. See infra note 246 and accompanying text (discussing legal uncertainty and
overdeterrence).
157. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 439–41 (2004)
(discussing a variety of ways in which “[b]ad judges” neglect their duties).
158. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons
of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1609–12 (2006) (explaining why
prosecutors’ cognitive biases can lead to Brady violations).
159. See, e.g., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., MINOR
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR
COURTS 15 (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/20b7a219-b631-48b7-b34a2d1cb758bdb4/minor-crimes-massive-waste-the-terrible-toll-of-america-s-brokenmisdemeanor-courts.pdf [https://perma.cc/WL9W-M3SR] (noting that the chief justice of the
South Carolina Supreme Court stated she “simply told [her] magistrates that we just don’t
have the resources” to effectuate the Supreme Court’s extension of the right to appointed
counsel in Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), adding, “[s]o I will tell you straight up
we [are] not adhering to Alabama v. Shelton in every situation” (third alteration in original)
(quoting Jean Hoefer Toal, Chief Just., Sup. Ct. of S.C., Address at the 22nd Annual Criminal
Law Update of the South Carolina Bar Association (Jan. 26, 2007))).
160. This theory does not play out well in practice. See infra notes 168–76 and
accompanying text.
161. To see why, consider the following scenarios. First, and most obviously, if the grand
jury refused to indict, it follows that the error had no effect and the prosecution gained nothing
from it. Similarly, if the grand jury did indict but the defendant was later acquitted at trial, the
error must not have affected the trial outcome, even though it conceivably may have affected
the grand jury’s decision at the charging stage. Finally, if the grand jury issued an indictment
and the petit jury later convicted the defendant of the same charge or charges, the conviction
(under the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt) is a strong indicator that the grand
jury (applying the far less stringent probable cause standard) would have issued an indictment
anyway, even if the prosecutor had not erred, meaning that in this scenario, too, the error did
not contribute to the outcome. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70–71 (1986).
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predictably—indeed, automatically—deem them harmless and decline to
reverse.162
More broadly, whenever the prosecution’s admissible evidence
overwhelmingly supports a particular outcome, virtually no error, no matter
how egregious it might be, will have much of an impact on the outcome.163
To the extent this condition exists—or more precisely, to the extent
reviewing courts believe it exists,164 as they frequently do165—trial judges,
prosecutors, and others will be in a position to violate the law in just about
any way they please without facing a meaningful risk of reversal under an
outcome-centric harmless error regime.166 To be sure, no one will have much
of an incentive to err in order to influence the outcome in cases where the
evidence against the defendant is overwhelming because, by hypothesis, the
outcome is essentially a foregone conclusion anyway. It bears repeating,
however, that errors spring from many different causes—not solely or, I
think, primarily, from a calculated effort to stack the deck.167 In cases where
the untainted evidence is overwhelming, or will seem overwhelming to a
reviewing court, conventional harmless error rules remove any credible
prospect of reversal from the equation, leaving judges, prosecutors, and
162. See, e.g., id. at 72–73 (deeming violations of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d)
during grand jury proceedings harmless in light of the petit jury’s verdict). Two caveats are
in order. First, when a grand jury error is detected before trial, the defendant can request that
the trial court dismiss the indictment without prejudice. At least in the federal system,
however, the trial court would not be able to order dismissal unless the error had affected the
outcome at the grand jury stage (i.e., the decision to indict)—if the trial court refused to
dismiss, the defendant would have no right to appeal that ruling unless and until convicted at
trial, at which point Mechanik would apply, requiring the appellate court to affirm on harmless
error grounds. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Supervision of the Grand Jury: Who Watches the
Guardian?, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 885, 893–96 (1990). Second, racial discrimination in selecting
the grand jury is one of the few types of errors that generally leads to automatic reversal on
appeal. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986). But while the Court “labored
mightily [in Hillery] to produce a reason why grand jury discrimination might affect the
accuracy of a subsequent conviction . . . the strain is obvious.” Eric L. Muller, Solving the
Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE
L.J. 93, 126 (1996) (“Hillery may best be understood . . . as a last gasp from the group of
Justices who opposed the Court’s growing fixation on the reliability of verdicts.”).
163. See infra notes 165, 187 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 186.
164. From a deterrence standpoint, it is the putative sanctioner’s perceptions that ultimately
matter. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 6
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 341, 349–50 (2010). Insofar as trial judges, prosecutors, and others
fear reversal, they will strive to anticipate the reviewing court’s perspective—as relevant here,
the reviewing court’s perspective concerning whether the prosecution’s untainted evidence is
overwhelming—and act accordingly. Id.
165. See, e.g., 3B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 50, § 854 (“Perhaps the single most significant
factor in weighing whether an error was harmful . . . is the strength of the case against the
defendant.”). When a reviewing court assessing harmlessness concludes that the prosecution
has “overwhelming evidence” against the defendant, “[this] alone may be dispositive.” State
v. Romero, 381 P.3d 297, 302 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016); accord Harrington v. California, 395
U.S. 250, 254 (1969). Even when the evidence is not overwhelming, the strength or weakness
of the prosecution’s case remains an important factor in the analysis. See, e.g., Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 639 (1993).
166. But cf. supra Part I.C (discussing narrow exceptions where reversal is available
outside the harmless error framework).
167. See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text.
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others largely unconstrained to break the law for reasons other than
influencing the outcome.
But what about procedural errors that do cause outcome-determinative
prejudice? Can we depend on reviewing courts to reliably identify and set
aside outcomes that are tainted by error so that the conventional approach to
harmless error review will at least produce adequate deterrence with respect
to the subset of errors that help the prosecution get across the finish line?
I am deeply skeptical, for outcome-centric harmless error review is a
complex and precarious enterprise.168 At its core, assessing outcomedeterminative prejudice involves estimating “the impact of the thing done
wrong on the minds of other men, not on one’s own.”169 Whether the object
of inquiry is a plea-bargained outcome,170 a trial verdict,171 or a sentence,172
“one must judge others’ reactions not by his own, but with allowance for how
others might react”173—a challenging task that demands a possibly
unrealistic level of intersubjective understanding.174 Moreover, outcomecentric harmless error analysis requires mastery of the “whole record,”175
since the outcomes of criminal cases often stem from diverse causal factors
that collectively persuade the relevant decision maker, not a single item of
evidence or other factor considered in a vacuum. Detecting outcomedeterminative prejudice is therefore a “fact-intensive” process that can
require a large investment of scarce time and attention176—an investment
that reviewing courts are not always willing or able to make.
Commentators have proposed a number of ideas to help reviewing courts
do a better job sniffing out when legal errors have influenced the outcome.177
Many contend that there is a divide within outcome-centric harmless error
168. My doubts on this score are shared by dozens of other commentators who have
analyzed the capacity of reviewing courts to detect outcome-determinative prejudice. See,
e.g., Linda E. Carter, Harmless Error in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Case: A Doctrine
Misunderstood and Misapplied, 28 GA. L. REV. 125, 151–57 (1993); Dow & Rytting, supra
note 101, at 503–17; Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 107–09
(2008); Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Adjudication, Error Correction, and Hindsight Blind
Spots, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165, 200–04 (2016); Kamin, supra note 12, at 62–71; Dan
Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 579–83 (2004); Jason M. Solomon, Causing Constitutional Harm: How
Tort Law Can Help Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Trials, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1053,
1085–95 (2005); Lee E. Teitelbaum et al., Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can
Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1147, 1181–
86.
169. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
170. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
173. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764.
174. See Murray, supra note 14, at 307 n.193, 311 n.217 (summarizing empirical evidence
regarding the reliability of reviewing courts’ harmless error determinations).
175. E.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).
176. E.g., Rhodes v. Dittmann, 903 F.3d 646, 664 (7th Cir. 2018).
177. As mentioned before, there is also a voluminous academic literature urging courts to
categorically exempt certain types of procedural error from harmless error review. See supra
notes 100–01 and accompanying text (discussing automatic reversal rules).
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jurisprudence between cases that embody a “guilt-based” approach, which
these commentators find objectionable, and cases that reflect an “effect-onthe-verdict” approach, which the critics say should become the norm.178
Others believe that reviewing courts should demand a greater degree of
certainty that errors had no effect on the outcome before deeming them
harmless.179 And for cases that proceed to trial, a few commentators have
suggested that the fact finder, whether it be a jury or judge, should be invited
to explain the basis for its decision—through special verdicts, interrogatories,
or other techniques—so that reviewing courts will not have to speculate about
whether an error impacted the verdict.180 While I think some of these reform
strategies are worthwhile and would do some good, I doubt they would
significantly alleviate the systemic problems this section has identified.
Working in reverse order, the third option—eliciting direct evidence from
the jury or trial judge regarding what drove the decision—would make
outcome-centric harmless error review a bit more dependable in some
situations.181 Most of the time, though, I think trial judges and litigants
would find it difficult to predict what questions will become salient on appeal
or subsequent review and thus what questions need to be answered before
trial court proceedings come to a close.
The second idea—raising the bar that must be cleared for a reviewing court
to say that an error did not affect the outcome—also might help in contexts
not already covered by the Chapman test, a test that requires the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome is not attributable to
error.182 But even Chapman’s seemingly stringent standard has not
prevented reviewing courts from finding—often for rather flimsy
reasons183—that many constitutional errors are harmless, especially where
the court considers the prosecution’s evidence overwhelming.184
And finally, proponents of the first strategy—which would reorient
outcome-centric harmless error review away from a “guilt-based” approach
178. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When
Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167 passim (1995).
179. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 45, at 1021–22 (arguing that the Chapman harmless
error test should apply to nonconstitutional errors just as it does to constitutional errors).
180. See, e.g., TRAYNOR, supra note 25, at 23–24; see also D. Alex Winkelman et al., An
Empirical Method for Harmless Error, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1405, 1417–19 (2014) (arguing for
commissioning experiments in appropriate cases—employing mock jurors, a control group,
and vignettes that summarize the relevant facts and law—to estimate the likelihood of
conviction with and without procedural error).
181. So would the experimental approach to evaluating prejudice discussed in the
preceding footnote. See supra note 180.
182. See generally supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (discussing the Chapman test
and its scope).
183. See supra note 168 (identifying relevant academic literature, much of it critical of the
way reviewing courts have implemented Chapman).
184. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (noting that the strength or weakness of
the evidence against the defendant is a major factor—probably the main factor—in outcomecentric harmless error analysis); see also supra note 45 (noting that scholars and judges do not
all agree about whether and to what extent the variations among outcome-centric harmless
error tests make much of a difference).
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in favor of an “effect-on-the-verdict” approach185—diagnose a serious
ailment but prescribe the wrong cure. As should by now be clear, I share the
concern that the dominant method of harmless error review is unduly guiltbased and that the strength (or weakness) of the evidence against the
defendant should not play such a determinative role in the evaluation of
harmlessness.186 Yet the solution, in my view, cannot be to substitute one
type of outcome-centric harmless error review for another. As I have
explained in prior work,
[t]he question posed by the guilt-based approach to harmless error
review—whether the prosecution’s untainted evidence is so overwhelming
that any reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict as the actual
jury—is . . . an indispensible ingredient of the effect-on-the-verdict
approach and not something alien to it.187

As long as harmless error doctrine remains built on the premise that
outcome-determinative prejudice is the only kind of harm that truly matters,
deep reform will elude our grasp. This does not mean we should despair;
rather, it means we need to look elsewhere for answers—a task I take up in
Part III. But before examining potential solutions, the next section explores
a second way in which the conventional approach to harmless error review
objectionably loosens oversight of the lower criminal courts.
B. Avoidance
Procedural errors are not always the product of nefarious intentions or
inadequate precautions. As we have seen, even trial judges and prosecutors
who make a good faith, reasonably diligent effort to follow legally required
procedures may nevertheless err through little fault of their own when the
law itself is unclear.188 A natural way to minimize this risk, of course, is to
make the law more perspicuous by resolving unsettled legal issues. But
conventional harmless error rules inhibit the adjudication of novel questions
of law because they tempt reviewing courts to “bypass the merits”189—that
is, to reject procedural claims on fact-bound harmless error grounds while
announcing no decision regarding whether the law was violated to begin
with. When reviewing courts determine that an alleged error did not affect
the outcome and therefore was harmless but decline to address whether an
185. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text.
187. Murray, supra note 11, at 1804–05; see also id. at 1801–04; accord Daniel J.
Kornstein, A Bayesian Model of Harmless Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 143 (1976) (arguing
that there is no deep conceptual rift within modern harmless error jurisprudence between a
guilt-based approach and an effect-on-the-outcome approach, since “the probability of guilt
given the rest of the [untainted] evidence . . . is absolutely necessary to arrive at an intelligent
conclusion regarding the error’s effect on the verdict”).
188. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
189. John M. M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional
Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 405–06 (1999) (noting
that qualified immunity and other remedial doctrines enable courts, when “presented with a
novel constitutional claim for which the relief sought is unavailable,” to “bypass the merits of
the claim, rejecting it on the straightforward premise that it cannot be remedied”).
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error actually occurred, they leave procedural law in exactly the same
condition it was in at the outset and fail to educate trial judges, prosecutors,
and other relevant entities about what they ought to do going forward.
As an illustration, consider State v. Hull.190 The defendant claimed that
the trial court had erred by allowing the prosecution to introduce expert
testimony involving handwriting and fingerprint analysis without conducting
a full hearing to ensure its reliability.191 The trial court summarily concluded
that handwriting and fingerprint analysis had been “generally accepted as
scientifically reliable for a long time” and thus refused to let the defendant
put on contrary evidence at the pretrial admissibility hearing.192 On appeal,
the Minnesota Supreme Court “decline[d] to decide whether the district court
erred in failing to hold a complete . . . hearing before admitting the
evidence.”193 In lieu of ruling on the merits, the court concluded that “any
error in the admission of either type of forensic evidence was harmless”
because, given the “extensive evidence” establishing the defendant’s guilt,
“there is no reasonable possibility that the admission of the evidence
significantly affected the verdict.”194 Justice Helen M. Meyer penned a
concurring opinion criticizing the majority for “skip[ping] over” the
threshold question of whether the trial court had erred in truncating its pretrial
inquiry regarding the reliability of the prosecution’s handwriting and
fingerprint evidence.195 As Justice Meyer explained, “this issue has wideranging implications for future cases,” and “we do a disservice to district
courts and the administration of criminal justice in this state by declining to
decide the issue on its merits.”196
Cases like Hull, in which a reviewing court uses the harmless error rule to
avoid addressing whether a defendant’s claim of error is well-founded, are
fairly commonplace.197 Two facets of current doctrine make it possible for
190. 788 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2010).
191. See id. at 102–04.
192. Id. at 103 (quoting the trial court decision). The trial court did conduct a pretrial
hearing but limited its scope “to the second prong of the Frye-Mack test,” i.e., “whether the
laboratory conducting the tests in the individual case complied with appropriate standards and
controls,” while not allowing the defense to present evidence contesting the first prong, i.e.,
“whether experts in the field widely share the view that the results of scientific testing are
scientifically reliable.” Id. (quoting State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn.
2002)).
193. Id. at 104.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 108 (Meyer, J., concurring).
196. Id. Justice Meyer ultimately agreed with her colleagues that the harmless error rule
required affirmance in light of the “overwhelming evidence” against the defendant. Id. at 110–
11. But before considering harmlessness, Justice Meyer “would address the substantive issue
this case presents,” holding that “the district court erred when it limited the admissibility
hearings.” Id. at 108–09.
197. To get a rough sense of the prevalence of this phenomenon, I collected a sample of
seventy-five federal criminal decisions that resolved a total of 208 qualifying procedural
claims on direct appeal between November 23, 2019, and December 10, 2019. Of these
seventy-five decisions, twelve (16.0 percent) avoided resolving whether error occurred as to
at least one of the defendant’s claims by finding the alleged error harmless. Of the 208
qualifying procedural claims, fourteen (6.7 percent) were rejected by the court on harmless
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courts to employ harmless error review in this way—as an instrument of legal
avoidance. The first has to do with courts’ discretion to choose which step
of the error/harmlessness inquiry to lead with, and the second relates to how
courts evaluate harmlessness if and when they reach the issue.
First, in reviewing claims that are subject to the harmless error rule, courts
have unbridled discretion to commence their analysis either by deciding
whether an error occurred or, instead, examining whether the alleged error
was harmless. Hull is typical in this regard.198 For one of the defendant’s
claims—relating to the prosecution’s forensic evidence—the court
“decline[d] to decide whether the district court erred,” opting to consider
harmlessness first.199 At the same time, the court began its analysis of several
other defense claims by adjudicating error, finding no error in most instances
and, with respect to one claim, finding that the trial court had erred but that
the error was harmless.200 The court did not explain why it sequenced its
analysis one way—resolving harmlessness before error—when reviewing
the forensic evidence claim, while turning that chronology on its head for the
remaining claims.201 It simply proceeded in whichever order it preferred for
each claim, exercising the same discretion over decisional sequencing that
courts have taken for granted in countless other cases.202
Some scholars have suggested that courts actually lack such discretion, at
least with respect to constitutional errors; in their view, the law currently
requires courts to decide whether there was a constitutional error before
error grounds without a ruling as to whether there was an error. Although not directly relevant
to my immediate point, it may also be of interest that the court expressly addressed the
question of harmlessness for thirty-six (17.3 percent) of the claims, and of those thirty-six
claims, thirty-one (86.1 percent) were deemed harmless while five (13.9 percent) were deemed
not harmless. In fairness, these numbers paint a somewhat bleaker picture of defendants’
prospects than a full examination of the data would suggest, as a few defense claims resulted
in partial or wholesale reversal even though the court did not explicitly consider harmlessness,
perhaps because the government chose not to litigate the matter or because an automatic
reversal rule was applicable. As used here, the term “qualifying procedural claims”
encompasses (1) claims that call for separate analysis of error and outcome-determinative
prejudice, as do the vast majority of procedural claims; and (2) claims for which error leads to
automatic reversal. The term excludes claims involving so-called prejudice-based rights—
that is, rights for which outcome-determinative prejudice is hardwired into the test for error,
rendering the very idea of a harmless error logically impossible. Cf. infra note 305 and
accompanying text (defining prejudice-based rights). The methodology and dataset used to
calculate these results are on file with the author and with the Fordham Law Review. They
are available on request.
198. Revealingly, Justice Meyer’s concurrence did not cast doubt on the court’s power to
follow this order of operations; rather, she thought the court should exercise its discretion
differently for prudential reasons. See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text.
199. Hull, 788 N.W.2d at 104.
200. See id. at 101–02, 105–06.
201. Instead of providing a reason for sidestepping the merits of the defendant’s challenge
to the trial court’s pretrial procedure relating to forensic evidence, the court simply cited
another case in which it had previously done the same thing. Id. at 104 (citing State v. Fratzke,
354 N.W.2d 402, 409 (Minn. 1984)).
202. See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372 (1972) (“Assuming, arguendo, that
the challenged testimony should have been excluded, the record clearly reveals that any error
in its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
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conducting harmless error review.203 The main case those scholars rely on
is Lockhart v. Fretwell,204 where the Supreme Court rejected an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on the ground that the defendant had failed to
establish prejudice205 under Strickland v. Washington.206 In response to a
dissenting opinion accusing the majority of improperly applying harmless
error review to a violation of the right to counsel,207 the majority remarked
in a footnote that “today’s decision does not involve or require a harmlesserror inquiry” because “[h]armless-error analysis is triggered only after the
reviewing court discovers that an error has been committed,” whereas under
Strickland, “an error of constitutional magnitude occurs . . . only if the
defendant demonstrates . . . prejudice.”208
The majority, however, cited no authority and put forward no reasoning to
support its assertion regarding the order of operations in cases covered by the
harmless error rule.209 And the Court had said just the opposite, indicating
that courts have discretion to start their analyses with either error or
harmlessness, on at least one other occasion.210 Viewed in context,
Fretwell’s footnote does not plausibly stand for the proposition that harmless
error review is forbidden until there has been an error determination. Rather,
it seems that the Fretwell majority meant only to make the point that for
Strickland claims, prejudice constitutes part of the test for error, meaning that
the dissent was wrong (in the majority’s view, anyway) to characterize its
prejudice analysis as a form of harmless error review. Perhaps recognizing
that the Supreme Court, like Congress, does not make a habit of “hid[ing]
elephants in mouseholes,”211 reviewing courts have not ascribed much

203. See, e.g., Kamin, supra note 12, at 53–55.
204. 506 U.S. 364 (1993); see, e.g., James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Brecht v.
Abrahamson: Harmful Error in Habeas Corpus Law, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109,
1136 n.117 (1994).
205. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 366.
206. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
207. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 369 n.2 (majority opinion).
209. See id.
210. In its foundational decision fashioning the so-called good faith exception to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, the Court indicated that “[t]here is no need for courts to adopt
the inflexible practice of always deciding whether the officers’ conduct manifested objective
good faith before turning to the question whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated.”
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984). To fortify this conclusion, the Court noted
that its precedents in other domains, including “cases involving the harmless-error doctrine,
make clear [that] courts have considerable discretion in conforming their decisionmaking
processes to the exigencies of particular cases.” Id. at 924–25 (citations omitted) (first citing
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372 (1972); and then citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399
U.S. 1 (1970)). In Milton, the Court had dodged a claim alleging constitutional error by ruling
against the defendant on harmless error grounds, see supra note 202, while in Coleman, the
Court found constitutional error and then remanded the case for an evaluation of harmlessness.
See Coleman, 399 U.S. at 10–11.
211. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress, we have
held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”).
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weight to Fretwell’s dictum regarding the sequence of decision-making in
the harmless error context.212
The discretion courts possess to decide whether they wish to adjudicate
error or harmlessness first is not the only ingredient in the recipe for legal
avoidance—the second contributing factor is the outcome-centric character
of the inquiry courts ordinarily undertake when they reach the latter issue. If,
hypothetically, the law defined harmlessness in such a way that a court
conducting harmless error review would have to cover much of the same
analytical ground that it would traverse in deciding whether an error
happened below, the process of adjudicating harmlessness would clarify the
relevant legal norms even without a decision regarding error.213 But the
outcome-centric conception of harmlessness embedded in existing law lacks
this feature. Broadly speaking, the question of whether a challenged act
affected the outcome has little if any conceptual relationship to the question
of whether that act was lawful in the first instance.214 Whereas adjudicating
212. See Healy, supra note 13, at 893 (“[L]ower courts seem not to be taking the Court’s
instruction [in Fretwell] seriously.”). Scholars have also referenced Jones v. United States,
527 U.S. 373 (1999), specifically its twelfth footnote, as an indicator “suggest[ing] that the
Court meant what it said in Fretwell.” Healy, supra note 13, at 893; accord Sam Kamin, An
Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued
Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 53, 59 & n.31 (2008). In my judgment,
the footnote from Jones is no more illuminating than the one from Fretwell. By way of
background, although the Court granted certiorari in Jones for the limited purpose of deciding
whether “the submission of invalid nonstatutory aggravating factors was harmless,” and the
government did not argue that the nonstatutory aggravating factors were valid until after filing
its opposition to certiorari, the Court decided to reach the latter issue anyway. Jones, 527 U.S.
at 396–97, 397 n.12. To explain why the government did not waive that argument by
neglecting to develop it at the certiorari stage, the Court noted, “[W]e have not [deemed an
issue waived] when the issue not raised in the brief in opposition was ‘predicate to an
intelligent resolution of the question presented.’” Id. at 397 n.12 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996)). The Court then declared, “Assessing the error (including whether
there was error at all) is essential to an intelligent resolution of whether any such error was
harmless.” Id. The Court offered no explanation for this assertion, which, in any event, is
plainly wrong: as discussed below, the question a court must answer when conducting
outcome-centric harmless error review (did the alleged error affect the outcome?) has little or
no logical overlap with the question of whether error occurred, except in the special case of
so-called prejudice-based rights. See infra note 214 and accompanying text; accord Healy,
supra note 13, at 894 (attacking the Jones footnote’s logic).
213. For a discussion of the possibility of defining harmlessness in this manner, see infra
Part III.B.
214. This generalization is not technically correct in relation to the small subset of
procedural rights that have an outcome-centric prejudice element built into their doctrinal
definitions such that they “apply only when failing to apply them might cause prejudice by
affecting the outcome.” Murray, supra note 14, at 279 (defining “outcome-centric prejudicebased rights” or, for short, “prejudice-based rights”). For a right defined this way (Brady and
the right to effective assistance of counsel, for example, arguably fit the bill, see id. at 285–
89), a reviewing court’s decision as to whether prejudice occurred is one way to adjudicate
error and, thus, to guide trial judges, prosecutors, and others regarding the scope of their
procedural obligations. That said, many believe, as I do, see id. at 318–22, that Brady,
effective assistance, and perhaps other prejudice-based rights should not be set up this way
and that the law should be changed or clarified to conceptualize prejudice as a remedial issue
akin to harmless error, rather than as an element of the right. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing
this controversy and exploring whether the reforms to harmless error doctrine proposed in this
Article might profitably be extended to rights like Brady and effective assistance).
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error serves to educate trial judges, prosecutors, and other relevant entities
about what the law demands from them in similar future situations, outcomecentric harmless error rulings edify no one.215
I acknowledge that not every question of procedural law that reviewing
courts duck by pursuing a harm-first order of decision-making will have
“wide-ranging implications for future cases,” as did the issue in Hull.216 For
example, if the applicable procedural rule undergoes substantial change
during the interval between when the alleged error took place and when the
reviewing court renders its decision, it might not matter much prospectively
whether the challenged conduct was erroneous at the time it occurred. And
even for issues that do have broad importance, there may be cases in which
prudential considerations, such as an underdeveloped factual record or
deficient briefing, will weigh in favor of resorting to avoidance techniques
like harmless error review.217 If, say, resolution of a defendant’s claim of
error on the merits would necessitate a futile remand for additional factfinding—futile, that is, because even if the remand were to establish error,
the error would be harmless anyway—that might provide a strong reason for
a reviewing court to affirm on harmless error grounds rather than prolonging
the inevitable.218
In the mine run of cases, however, I think it is dangerous for reviewing
courts to use harmless error review as a means of bypassing the merits. If a
trial judge or prosecutor truly did violate procedural law in the manner a
defendant has alleged, that judge or prosecutor needs to be informed of this—
as do other relevant entities that may have had a role in causing the
215. Indeed, outcome-centric harmless error rulings are unlikely to furnish meaningful
guidance even to reviewing courts conducting harmless error review in other cases. After all,
whether an error affected the outcome is an inherently fact-bound inquiry that turns on an
“examination of the proceedings in their entirety, tempered but not governed in any rigid sense
of stare decisis by what has been done in similar situations.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 762 (1946).
216. State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 108 (Minn. 2010) (Meyer, J., concurring).
217. Although there sometimes are sound prudential reasons to adjudicate harmlessness
before error, a federal court is not constitutionally required by Article III and its prohibition
on advisory opinions to decide the issues in that sequence. See Healy, supra note 13, at 920–
21 (arguing that merits-first adjudication in the harmless error context probably does not
violate the ban on advisory opinions but that it nevertheless may be unwise). Relatedly, a
reviewing court’s decision that an error occurred does not become dicta if the court then
proceeds to find the error harmless. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1997, 2045–46 (1994) (arguing that, in this scenario, a court’s error ruling “is not dictum
in the sense of an aside” because “[i]t forms an essential ingredient in the process by which
the court decides the case, even if, viewed from a post hoc perspective, it is not essential to
the result”).
218. That said, it might still be possible for a reviewing court in situations like this one to
engage in partial but not wholesale avoidance, depending on the circumstances. Suppose, for
example, that a trial judge prematurely excluded defense evidence without allowing the
defendant to make a full proffer explaining what the evidence would show. The reviewing
court might hold that the judge lacked an adequate factual foundation to exclude the evidence
and, in that sense, erred, yet invoke the harmless error rule to avoid a remand, even though a
remand would enable the defendant to supplement the record with the proffer, laying the
groundwork for an informed decision regarding whether the judge was ultimately right or
wrong to exclude the evidence.
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violation—to avoid committing the same error in the future. Moreover, in
cases where it is not readily apparent whether the trial judge or prosecutor
acted unlawfully, other judges, prosecutors, and entities—not just the ones
involved in the case undergoing review—also stand to benefit when the
reviewing court tackles the issue head-on and clears up the ambiguity.219
Because trial judges, prosecutors, and the organizations to which they belong
are rarely subject to suit for civil damages,220 the criminal case review
process is the primary mechanism we have that can provide meaningful
feedback on the lawfulness of judicial and prosecutorial behavior in the lower
criminal courts. To the extent reviewing courts abdicate their responsibility
to set and maintain legal standards to guide the course of criminal
proceedings, no one else is likely to pick up the slack.
The existing academic literature has identified one possible solution to this
problem: a mandatory decisional sequencing rule that would deprive
reviewing courts of discretion to adjudicate harmlessness before error.221
The main exponent of this strategy, Sam Kamin, built his case by comparing
the structure of harmless error and qualified immunity analysis, exploiting
the fact that the Supreme Court’s then recent decision in Saucier v. Katz222
had imposed a compulsory error-first order of decision-making for qualified
immunity defenses.223
Saucier held that when a government official asserts a qualified immunity
defense, a court must first determine “whether a constitutional right would
have been violated on the facts alleged” and only then consider “whether the
219. Also, there is some risk that trial judges, prosecutors, and others might misconstrue a
harmless error ruling as a no error ruling—leading them to believe that the conduct challenged
by the defense is lawful and can be repeated in the future—or that a harmless error ruling will
be taken as an indication that the reviewing court does not take the allegedly illegal behavior
all that seriously. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 135, at 663. See generally Jonathan S. Masur
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 731 (2015)
(“[C]ourts should understand the deference regimes at issue in the precedents they cite
[but] . . . deference mistakes are commonplace in areas ranging from criminal procedure to
patent law, and . . . they can have pernicious effects on doctrinal development.”).
220. Absolute immunity shields judges and prosecutors from civil suits for damages
premised on conduct connected to the adjudicative process. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 427 (1976) (holding that prosecutors generally have absolute immunity from 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims for damages); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (same, as to judges).
And municipal entities, such as district attorneys’ offices, though subject to suit where there
is a widespread pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct, cannot be sued based on
ordinary principles of vicarious liability. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60–
61, 70–72, 70 n.12 (2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92
(1978)).
221. See Kamin, supra note 12, at 38–55. Besides Kamin, other commentators have
criticized courts’ reliance on harmless error review to avoid addressing error but without
exploring the issue in depth or examining potential solutions. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note
178, at 1182.
222. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
223. See Kamin, supra note 12, at 42–50 (discussing Saucier and its precursors). In
addition to Saucier, Kamin also leaned on Fretwell to support his position, though he
acknowledged—for good reason—that “it is not entirely clear that the Court meant what it
said in Fretwell.” Id. at 53; see also supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text (explaining
why Fretwell’s dictum does not amount to much).

1448

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

right was clearly established.”224 This protocol was needed, according to
Saucier, because “determining whether a constitutional right was
violated . . . is the process for the law’s elaboration from case to case,” and
“[t]he law might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip
ahead to the question whether the law clearly established that the officer’s
conduct was unlawful.”225 Drawing on Saucier, Kamin argued that the
harmless error rule presents the same risk as qualified immunity—the risk
that courts will “duck important questions of constitutional law and the law
will stagnate”—and thus that a strict rule governing courts’ order of
operations should apply to both, at least when constitutional errors are
involved.226
But the Supreme Court largely dismantled the doctrinal foundation for
Kamin’s proposal in Pearson v. Callahan.227 There, the Court unanimously
spurned Saucier’s two-step protocol for analyzing qualified immunity
defenses, echoing the views expressed by many federal judges who had
condemned it as a “failed . . . experiment” and a “puzzling misadventure in
constitutional dictum.”228 While the Court gave lip service to Saucier’s
goals, allowing that error-first decision-making in qualified immunity cases
“is often beneficial” to the extent it “promotes the development of
constitutional precedent,”229 this terse praise was followed by a litany of
grievances against “the rigid Saucier procedure.”230 Ultimately, the Court

224. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields police officers
and most other government officials from actions for civil damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982).
225. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
226. Kamin, supra note 12, at 38; see also id. at 72–73. In a later work, Kamin amended
his proposal a bit to allow, even require, reviewing courts to perform a limited harmless error
assessment at the outset of the adjudicative process so as to avoid issuing advisory opinions.
See Kamin, supra note 212, at 95–96. If a threshold assessment of harmlessness reveals that
the alleged error is “so trifling that no reasonable fact-finder could find that it had an effect on
the outcome,” Kamin would have the court stop there. Id. But Kamin anticipated that “in most
cases” a defense claim would clear this preliminary hurdle, leading to a full examination of
whether error occurred and then, if there was an error, to the final step of determining whether
the error was harmless. Id. at 96.
227. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
228. Id. at 234–35 (first quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 432 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); and then quoting Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under
the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1275 (2006)).
229. Id. at 236.
230. Id.; see also id. at 236–42. The Court’s attack on Saucier revolved around four main
claims: (1) the protocol’s first step (was there a violation?) can unnecessarily drain “scarce
judicial resources” when the answer at the second step (was the violation, if any, clear?) is
readily apparent; (2) step-one determinations “often fail to make a meaningful contribution to
[the law’s] development” and in some circumstances may even “create a risk of bad
decisionmaking”; (3) constitutional doctrine will continue to evolve in other remedial
environments, like criminal cases and actions for injunctive relief, even if not much new law
is being generated in actions for damages; and (4) individual judges “are in the best position
to determine the order of decision-making that will best facilitate the fair and efficient
disposition of each case.” Id. These claims have not gone unchallenged. See, e.g., John C.
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held that “courts should have the discretion to decide whether [the Saucier]
procedure is worthwhile in particular cases,” just as they do “[i]n other
analogous contexts,” such as when analyzing Strickland claims or issues
involving the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule.231
In light of Pearson and the related doctrinal contexts referenced by
Pearson, where courts possess discretion over the structure of their decisionmaking process, the outlook for a new sequencing rule applicable to harmless
error review looks rather grim. This prognosis does not mean Kamin’s idea
is unsound, of course; on the merits, I am highly sympathetic.232 But as
Pearson appears to have closed off that path for the foreseeable future—
certainly in federal litigation and probably in state litigation as well due to
the “gravitational pull” of federal law233—it is worth examining other ways
of getting at the problem that may yet remain doctrinally viable. The next
part takes up that task.
III. POLICING PROCEDURAL ERROR
This part presents an alternative framework for harmless error review that
responds to the pathologies identified in Part II: unaccountability and
avoidance. The framework has three novel aspects. In addition to examining
whether an error affected the outcome—this inquiry is decidedly not novel,
but it still has an important role to play—a reviewing court should also
consider whether: (1) reversal would substantially help to prevent future
errors, (2) the error caused substantial harm to a legally protected interest
unrelated to the outcome, and (3) the benefits of reversal outweigh its costs.
Just like under current law, reversal would generally be required if an error
caused outcome-determinative prejudice.234 But even an error that had no
Jeffries Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115,
120–37.
231. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 241–42. Regarding effective assistance, Strickland requires a
defendant to establish both attorney error and prejudice while entrusting “sound discretion [to]
lower courts to determine the order of decision.” Id. at 241. Regarding the exclusionary rule’s
good faith exception, see supra note 210.
232. In particular, I am sympathetic to the modified order-of-decision rule Kamin has put
forward, see supra note 212, under which reviewing courts would have to adjudicate error
before harmlessness unless the alleged error is obviously harmless on its face. See supra note
226 (discussing this version of Kamin’s proposed solution).
233. See generally Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 703 (2016) (arguing that the “gravitational force” of federal law influences states to look
to federal law as a model even when such conformity is not required).
234. A strong argument could be made, and other scholars have made it, that reviewing
courts should also reform the criteria they use in determining whether an error affected the
outcome and improve the way they apply those criteria in various circumstances. See supra
notes 177–80 and accompanying text (discussing proposals along these lines). But for the
sake of simplicity, the approach this Article puts forward would leave intact all current
outcome-centric harmless error rules—whatever they might be—as one pathway to reversal,
then supplement them with a second track (i.e., the three-step balancing inquiry just
summarized), bracketing the question whether outcome-centric rules should be reconfigured
in other ways. So, for example, a federal court assessing outcome-determinative prejudice
would continue to apply the Chapman standard for preserved claims on direct appeal,
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effect on the outcome might still lead to reversal on preventative grounds
(based on step one of the proposed balancing test) and/or because of harm to
a non-outcome-related interest (based on step two), if the costs and benefits
of reversal indicate that reversal is justified (based on step three). After
defending this approach and examining how to implement each of its new
components, this part suggests a few areas in which a similar strategy might
be used to reform other significant doctrinal impediments to appellate and
postconviction relief.
A. Prevention
The first thing courts should do differently when conducting harmless
error review is consider whether reversal would substantially help to prevent
errors in future cases. Reversal will almost always enhance marginal
deterrence to some degree.235 But since the prophylactic benefits of reversal
will be balanced against other interests when a court reaches the third stage
of the analysis,236 the propriety of reversal will ultimately hinge on the
anticipated magnitude of this effect, not whether any such effect exists.
In conducting this inquiry, what factors should courts be on the lookout
for? Although it is impossible to formulate an exhaustive list, the two most
important considerations will typically be whether the challenged conduct is
(1) part of a recurring pattern of error as opposed to an isolated event237 and
(2) obviously erroneous as opposed to a close call.238 When the action that
the defendant complains of reflects a pattern of unlawful behavior, is
obviously erroneous, or has both of these characteristics, a court will have
strong evidence that the procedural rules in question are not being taken
Kotteakos for preserved nonconstitutional claims and for constitutional claims raised during
postconviction review, and Olano (specifically, its third prong) for forfeited claims. See supra
notes 31–44 and accompanying text (discussing these standards). But a court that embraced
this Article’s framework would still need to perform a balancing analysis of the kind sketched
in this part—and potentially reverse based on that analysis—even if it found no effect on the
outcome under the applicable outcome-centric standard.
235. See generally supra Part II.A.1 (discussing reversal’s prophylactic mechanisms).
236. See infra Part III.C.
237. Cf. Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 400
(2007) (arguing that “substantial obstacles hinder legal efforts to enjoin persistent patterns of
constitutional criminal procedure violations” and exploring various strategies both inside and
outside the court system to identify and remedy recurring procedural errors); Eve Brensike
Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) (arguing that
“federal habeas review of state criminal convictions should focus on whether . . . a state actor
(or set of actors) violates defendants’ rights repeatedly, such that there is a pattern of violations
across multiple cases”).
238. Cf. Kamin, supra note 12, at 73 (arguing that “[p]rosecutorial violations of clearly
established constitutional rights should not be susceptible to the application of the harmless
error doctrine”). The point this Article makes here, regarding the heightened need for reversal
in cases involving obvious errors, resembles Kamin’s, though there are several notable
differences. Kamin’s proposal is limited to prosecutorial errors, see id. at 73–75, that violate
constitutional rights, see id. at 75–76, whereas mine also extends to judicial and
nonconstitutional errors. Also, Kamin would require automatic reversal for qualifying
obvious errors, see id. at 73, whereas the framework this Article envisions merely treats an
error’s flagrancy as a significant, but not inevitably dispositive, factor.
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sufficiently seriously and that reversal therefore may be needed for the sake
of deterrence.239 Conversely, if the allegedly erroneous conduct is neither a
recurring problem nor clearly unlawful, there ordinarily will not be a
compelling deterrence-related rationale for reversal.240 Yet as explained
below, even in cases that involve isolated, nonobvious errors, the first part of
my proposed framework would still help prevent future error by nudging
reviewing courts to resolve, rather than avoid, the threshold question whether
error occurred, thereby clarifying the law and reducing the risk of inadvertent
error going forward.
A pattern of error is a significant warning sign suggesting that the existing
accountability regime is too feeble to hold illegal behavior in check. Such a
pattern can sometimes arise within the confines of a single case—as when,
for example, a prosecutor commits numerous instances of misconduct over
the course of closing argument to a jury.241 But other patterns of error take
shape over the span of multiple cases.242 This Article’s opening paragraph
offers one illustration: in Washington State, the unlawful shackling of
criminal defendants during trial court proceedings is so pervasive that the
239. “Strong evidence” is not the same thing as ironclad proof, of course—circumstances
may arise where reversal is not needed as a prophylactic despite a recurring pattern of error or
a particularly flagrant error. If, for example, a courthouse or prosecutor’s office had revised
its policies in a manner that addresses the error’s underlying causes, or if effective alternative
sanctions are available to ensure adequate deterrence, reversal might well not be necessary on
prophylactic grounds despite a recurring or obvious error. See, e.g., United States v. Williams,
949 F.3d 1056, 1065 (7th Cir. 2020) (applying the Liljeberg harmless error test and affirming
in part because a judicial ethics committee had already disciplined the offending trial judge,
and the judge had “changed his practices in response to the inquiry”). But assertions to the
effect that systemic failings have been fixed without the need for judicial intervention must be
scrutinized with care. Far too often courts cite the theoretical existence of some other possible
remedy as a reason to withhold the remedy a litigant is currently seeking even though, in
reality, the supposed alternative is illusory. See generally Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer,
Enforcing Rights, 62 UCLA L. REV. 306 (2015) (documenting and criticizing courts’ tendency
to confine constitutional litigation to a single remedial avenue).
240. This Article’s emphasis on recurring and obvious illegality in connection with
assessing deterrence is of a piece with recent Supreme Court decisions applying the good faith
exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, with the important caveat that I am
using those concepts to liberalize access to remedies, whereas the Court has deployed them to
restrict relief. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (“To trigger the
exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can
meaningfully deter it . . . . [T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or
grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”); see
also Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, Apparent Fault, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1550–52
(2018) (discussing Herring and subsequent related cases).
241. See, e.g., State v. Payne, 797 A.2d 1088, 1094–100 (Conn. 2002) (reversing on
supervisory power grounds largely because of a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct both
within and across cases); see also supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text (explaining how appellate courts
applying Michigan’s unorthodox two-part harmless error test responded to certain kinds of
recurrent prosecutorial misconduct); see also, e.g., In re Al-Nashiri, 921 F.3d 224, 239–40
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (applying the Liljeberg harmless error test to vacate over three years of
pretrial rulings in a high-profile prosecution against a Guantanamo Bay detainee, reasoning in
part that “we cannot dismiss [the military judge’s] lapse as a one-time aberration, as [the
defendant’s motion] is not the first meritorious request for recusal that our court has
considered with respect to military commission proceedings”).
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state’s appellate courts found error related to shackling in fourteen cases over
a four-and-a-half-year period.243
Another consideration that should be central to a reviewing court’s
deterrence inquiry is whether the challenged conduct is not merely erroneous
but obviously erroneous.244 More specifically, what I have in mind is
conduct that was clearly prohibited ex ante as opposed to conduct that was
lawful or even arguably lawful at the time it occurred but later became plainly
unlawful due to an intervening alteration or clarification of the law. Defined
this way, obviously erroneous conduct is a strong indicator of fault, whether
it be the fault of an individual judge or prosecutor whose unreasonable
actions led to the error or the fault of an organization or system that failed to
resource, train, or otherwise equip its frontline personnel to follow clearly
established law.245 Much like negligence liability enables lawmakers to
disincentivize unreasonable activity without obstructing harmful yet netbeneficial activity,246 treating obvious illegality more harshly than
reasonable mistakes in the harmless error context would prompt judges,
prosecutors, and other entities to exercise due care to prevent unreasonable
243. See State v. Jackson, 447 P.3d 633, 642 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019) (Melnick, J.,
concurring) (documenting this pattern of error but voting to affirm on harmless error grounds);
see also supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. Gauging the extent of a pattern of error
spanning multiple cases can pose significant evidentiary challenges. Ideally, most or all of
the relevant errors would appear in a published or otherwise searchable judicial opinion that
includes the name of the offending trial judge or prosecutor. In reality, the subset of errors
that find their way into a publicly available court opinion are likely to be the tip of a much
larger iceberg. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Regulating Prosecutors’ Courtroom Misconduct, 50
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 797, 814–18 (2019) (noting that trial judges confronted with courtroom
misconduct by prosecutors “typically settle at most for on-the-record rebukes” that are not
memorialized and thus “provide little, if any, deterrence” and urging the creation of
“repositories of trial transcripts reflecting prosecutors’ misbehavior”). And although appellate
opinions list names of the trial judges as a matter of course, prosecutors’ names are rarely
included, even in cases where prosecutorial misconduct is found. See, e.g., Adam M.
Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct,
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1067–84 (2009). This Article’s call for reviewing courts to
identify and disrupt patterns of error would thus work best if pursued in tandem with various
strategies other scholars have devised to enhance courts’ systemic awareness. See, e.g.,
Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts,
129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2101–17 (2016) (exploring a number of tools to strengthen “systemic
factfinding” so as to “help criminal courts better fulfill their . . . role as systemic regulators of
law enforcement behavior”).
244. Cf. supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining that the first prong of Michigan’s
unorthodox two-part harmless error test examines whether prosecutorial error was deliberate
or flagrantly negligent).
245. Inevitably, a reasonable person acting with due care will make some mistakes, even
ones that are obvious—and thus unreasonable—from time to time. The same is true a fortiori
with respect to organizations comprised of many people and of the state as a whole. Cf. Landes
& Posner, supra note 7, at 181 (“[T]he complexity of modern criminal procedure suggests that
a zero level of inadvertent errors could not be attained at reasonable cost.”). Even so, an
error’s obviousness is a sign—circumstantial evidence, not irrefutable proof—of either
inadequate precaution or bad faith at an individual, organizational, or system-wide level. Cf.
id. at 182 & n.22 (modeling how harmless error review interacts with prosecutorial incentives
using “the ﬂagrancy of the error as a proxy for the likelihood of its being intentional”).
246. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32–33
(1972).
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errors, while leaving them with breathing room to take risks and experiment
with untested approaches in unsettled areas of law.
Patterns of error and obvious errors are often, though not invariably,
layered on top of one another, revealing a deeper accountability deficit than
either might imply on its own. For example, although a moderately large
number of errors might not seem too worrisome in an unsettled area of law
where novel issues abound and mistakes come with the territory, a
numerically comparable pattern of errors takes on a more sinister cast when
some or all of the errors are clear-cut and inexcusable. Reversal might not
be warranted in the former scenario, whereas in the latter case, it may be
necessary to disrupt an entrenched pattern of lawlessness. Likewise, an
obvious error that only crops up every once in a while can perhaps be
regarded as an innocent oversight, suggesting little compelling need to stage
an intervention. But if the same flagrant violation is repeated time and again,
reviewing courts should begin to suspect that lack of diligence or even foul
play are at work behind the curtain and that reversal may help straighten out
the responsible parties’ payoff matrices.
What should a reviewing court do in the inverse of this situation—that is,
when a legal error may have occurred below but the alleged error was neither
recurring nor obvious? Although reversal might well not be warranted (at
least not on prophylactic grounds) in many such cases, a court using my
approach might still need to intervene in a less drastic manner.
Recall, from Part II, that reviewing courts often avoid resolving claims of
error on the merits by assuming, without deciding, that there was a legal
error, then holding that the assumed error was harmless.247 While my
proposal does not prohibit this avoidance technique, it would make the
practice more difficult for a reviewing court to justify in cases where the
challenged conduct is erroneous but not obviously erroneous. Whereas
obvious errors suggest that reversal may be needed to incentivize
compliance, nonobvious errors suggest that the law requires clarification and
that, absent clarification, similar errors are likely to recur in the future. To
the extent a court reviewing a nonobvious error is deciding between
avoidance—that is, affirming on harmless error grounds without adjudicating
error—and reversal, the first step of this Article’s proposed test will often
weigh in favor of reversal, as reversal entails finding that an error occurred
and thereby will reduce the likelihood that the error will inadvertently be
repeated. But avoidance and reversal are not the only available options, of
course, in cases involving nonobvious errors: the court can also identify the
error while affirming on harmless error grounds. My approach nudges courts
to do just that. Once the court has found that an error was committed and has
carefully explained what the law demands, it can credibly hold that no further
action is needed to prevent future errors.248 Not only can the court then

247. See supra Part II.B.
248. For much the same reason, a court should generally publish its opinion when it
identifies a nonobvious error; otherwise, its ruling will lack precedential effect, and the state
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presume—until proven otherwise—that trial judges and prosecutors will do
their best to comply with the law’s newly clarified strictures, but it can also
caution more or less explicitly that future errors of a similar kind—which,
going forward, will be obviously erroneous and part of a recurring pattern of
error—will not be treated so tenderly.249
B. Procedural Harm
The second component of my proposal calls for reviewing courts to
consider whether a procedural error caused substantial harm to a legally
protected interest unrelated to the outcome. Conventional harmless error
rules treat the defendant’s stake in the outcome as the only interest that
ultimately matters, at least for purposes of appellate and postconviction
review.250 But as I have argued previously, in an article entitled A Contextual
Approach to Harmless Error Review, criminal procedure doctrine does not
share harmless error case law’s “singular preoccupation . . . with the outputs
of criminal processes.”251 Criminal procedure’s normative horizon at times
encompasses a diverse array of ‘non-truth-furthering’ interests—interests
that include providing defendants with space for autonomous decisionmaking, enforcing compliance with nondiscrimination norms, and making
transparent the inner workings of criminal justice—in addition to ‘truthfurthering’ objectives.252

Reviewing courts should therefore assess harmlessness in a “contextual”
manner that would revolve around “the constellation of interests served by
the particular procedural rule that was infringed” rather than “automatically
confin[ing] the harmless error inquiry to estimating the error’s effect on the
outcome.”253
of the law will remain obscure. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the
Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1373–74 (1995).
249. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text (explaining that Michigan courts, in
applying the state’s unorthodox two-part harmless error test, have used a similar technique by
affirming on harmless error grounds in one case while simultaneously warning that the
recurrence of similar errors in future cases would likely lead to reversal).
250. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986) (“The thrust of the many
constitutional rules governing the conduct of criminal trials is to ensure . . . fair and correct
judgments. Where . . . the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed.”).
251. Murray, supra note 11, at 1791.
252. Id. at 1795 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking
Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 94 (1988); and then quoting Robert
M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court,
86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1092 (1977)). I acknowledge, however, that the criminal justice system’s
commitment to these goals is profoundly inconstant and often gives way when competing
interests assert themselves. See Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in
Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 183, 187–89 (2014).
253. Murray, supra note 11, at 1791. Specifically, contextual harmless error review
involves two steps. A court “would begin by identifying the interest (or range of interests)
protected by whichever procedural rule was infringed.” Id. at 1795. It would then “examine
whether the error harmed the interests identified in the first step of the analysis to a degree
substantial enough to justify reversal.” Id. at 1791. For purposes of this section, I am more
interested in contextual harmless error review’s first step: interest identification. Balancing,
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The goal of this section is not to elaborate on arguments from my prior
article, which I have just summarized in condensed form, but to highlight two
ways in which contextual harmless error review could help address the
distinct set of problems this Article addresses relating to systemic error
prevention. My first point has to do with deterrence; the second is about
avoidance.
First, the optimal level of deterrence for any particular type of legal error
is a function of, among other things, the error’s cost254—or, expressed
differently, the extent to which the error harms the interests of criminal
defendants and society as a whole. Even if a court, in applying the first part
of this Article’s proposal, projected that reversal would likely lead to a
significant reduction in the incidence of legal violations, the court would still
need to figure out how much it should care about the violations that might be
prevented. Otherwise, the court would have no coherent way to balance the
benefit of deterring illegal conduct against the social cost of reversal upon
reaching the third and final analytical step in the scheme I envision. For
example, hearkening back to the discussion of unlawful shackling from this
Article’s opening paragraph,255 an appellate court in the state of Washington
would need to develop a rough sense not only of how many shackling
violations reversal would forestall but also of the magnitude of harm such
violations tend to cause, so it could then make an informed decision regarding
whether reversal is warranted for prophylactic reasons.
By requiring courts to account for a broader spectrum of interests that can
be undermined by illegal conduct—not just interests relating to the
outcome—contextual harmless error review would force a more honest
reckoning with the cost of violating procedural law and the urgency of
deterring violations. To stick with the problem of shackling in Washington
for another moment, an appellate court accustomed to thinking about harm
through the lens of outcome-centric harmless error review might look at the
impressive track record of recent violations—fourteen appellate cases had
found shackling-related errors in the state’s courts over the course of about
four and a half years256—and failed to perceive any pressing need to stage an
intervention. Why? Because in all fourteen cases, the error did not affect the
outcome and, in that sense, was harmless—or so the appellate court found.257
If the only kind of harm that counts is outcome-determinative prejudice—
and if, moreover, the appellate court’s harmless error determinations can be

the second step of contextual harmless error review, is discussed in greater depth in the next
section.
254. Cf. Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 671 (1975)
(conceptualizing optimal deterrence in the context of regulating accidents as “the
minimization of the sum of accident costs and accident prevention costs”).
255. See supra notes 1–4.
256. See supra note 3.
257. See supra note 3. As noted earlier, the Washington State Supreme Court finally broke
this long string of affirmances by deeming a shackling error harmful, and thus reversing a
conviction, shortly after this Article was written. See supra note 3.
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trusted258—there would perhaps be little cause for alarm. But if, by contrast,
a reviewing court were to assess harm contextually, it would also have to
factor in other kinds of injury—to the defendant’s dignity and freedom—that
animate legal rules concerning shackling.259 A fuller understanding of the
relevant harms would make it harder to remain complacent even assuming
arguendo—yet dubitante260—that every one of those fourteen shackling
errors identified by Washington’s appellate courts had no bearing on the
outcome.
Second, contextual harmless error review would also mitigate the problem
of avoidance discussed in Part II.261 As explained earlier, the harmless error
rule is a potent avoidance tool due to reviewing courts’ discretion over the
order of decision—simply put, they can choose not to resolve whether error
occurred and skip ahead to harmless error review262—in combination with
the fact that outcome-centric harmless error rulings contribute little or
nothing of value to the law’s development.263 The first part of my proposal,
introduced in the previous section, gets at one dimension of the avoidance
puzzle: by obliging courts to analyze whether reversal would help prevent
future errors, it would nudge them to adjudicate error more often in cases
where the law is unclear.264 Yet even a court that embraced this Article’s
approach might sometimes choose to affirm on harmless error grounds
without addressing the defendant’s claim of error on the merits.265 It is in
those cases that a contextual approach to harmless error review would
alleviate avoidance—not by preventing it completely but by blunting its
significance when it does occur.
For instance, consider the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Wright v. Estelle266
(Wright I). The defendant, Archie Wright, told his court-appointed attorney
that he wanted to testify during his trial for capital murder.267 The attorney
refused, as he feared the jury would discredit Wright and become more
inclined to impose a death sentence.268 After he was convicted, Wright filed
258. Although I have not individually reexamined each of the fourteen rulings, it strikes
me as implausible that an error as serious and potentially prejudicial as illegally shackling a
defendant during judicial proceedings would not cause outcome-determinative prejudice even
a single time in a sample size that large. Cf. supra notes 168–76 and accompanying text
(discussing reasons to doubt the reliability of outcome-centric harmless error review).
259. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons behind legal rules
relating to shackling).
260. See supra note 258.
261. See supra Part II.B.
262. See supra notes 188–212.
263. See supra notes 213–27.
264. See supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text.
265. To reiterate, this Article is not suggesting that reviewing courts should have their
discretion over decisional sequencing stripped from them. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
266. 549 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1977), adopted on reh’g, 572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc).
267. Id. at 972.
268. The various opinions characterize this aspect of the record somewhat differently.
Compare id. at 974 (“The findings of the court below indicate that Wright’s counsel during
the above trial refused to allow him to testify.”), and Wright v. Estelle (Wright II), 572 F.2d
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a federal postconviction petition arguing that he had a “fundamental right
under the . . . Constitution to testify in his own behalf which could not be
waived by his attorney for purposes of trial strategy.”269 This issue was
unsettled at the time, in 1977: it was not until a decade later, in Rock v.
Arkansas,270 that the Supreme Court held that the Constitution protects a
defendant’s right to testify.271 And while it is now “well-established that the
right to testify may be waived only by the defendant,” that development also
took time to crystallize.272 Yet in Wright, the Fifth Circuit punted, explaining
in its panel opinion that “we need not consider the question of whether a
defendant has a fundamental right to testify in his own behalf that can only
be waived by him,” because “[t]he evidence connecting Wright to this crime
was overwhelming” and thus, even “assuming arguendo” that there was an
error, it was “harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.”273 The panel’s
opinion was adopted without change by the en banc court,274 although two
separate opinions at the en banc stage cast the majority’s disposition as an
“abdication of our responsibility” to “define the law so that litigants, lawyers,
and trial judges can proceed with some degree of certainty,”275 urging the
court to “face this case squarely.”276
Had the court employed this Article’s harmless error framework in Wright,
rather than the conventional, outcome-centric framework, it might still have

1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Godbold, J., dissenting) (“[L]ead counsel told Wright
that if Wright elected to testify the attorney would no longer represent him.”), with id. at 1073
(Thornberry, J., specially concurring) (“[T]he dialogue between Wright and his attorney
implicitly assumed that Wright could make the final choice to testify.”). But in light of the
views Judge Homer Thornberry expressed on the broader legal question presented by the case,
it appears he would have deemed the attorney’s conduct appropriate even if the attorney had
threatened to withdraw in the event Wright insisted on testifying. See infra note 279 and
accompanying text.
269. Wright I, 549 F.2d at 972.
270. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
271. See id. at 49. Several earlier cases by the Court had pointed in this direction, see Peter
Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 119 & nn.215–16 (1974), but
the Court’s prior remarks about the topic were arguably dicta. Cf. Rock, 483 U.S. at 63
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
272. Daniel J. Capra & Joseph Tartakovsky, Why Strickland Is the Wrong Test for
Violations of the Right to Testify, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 95, 155 (2013).
273. Wright I, 549 F.2d at 974 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
Nowadays, alleged right-to-testify errors of the kind that took place in Wright I, where defense
counsel overrides a client’s desire to take the stand, are typically analyzed under Strickland’s
ineffective assistance of counsel framework, see infra notes 307–10 and accompanying text,
not under the Chapman harmless error test that ordinarily applies to constitutional errors, see
supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. See Capra & Tartakovsky, supra note 272, at 111–
13 (summarizing this development and arguing that it has “rendered [the right to testify] a
nullity” because “the defendant loses almost every time” under Strickland’s prejudice prong).
For an exploratory discussion of how my proposed changes to the harmless error rule might
also be used to rethink effective assistance doctrine, see infra Part III.D.1.
274. Wright II, 572 F.2d 1071, 1072 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
275. Id. at 1072 & n.2 (Thornberry, J., specially concurring).
276. Id. at 1084 (Godbold, J., dissenting). Judges Thornberry and John Cooper Godbold
parted ways, however, regarding how they thought the defendant’s claim of error should be
resolved on the merits. See infra notes 279–81 and accompanying text.
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chosen to adjudicate harmlessness before error.277 But the court’s analysis
of harmlessness might itself have illuminated the governing legal principles,
even without a ruling on the merits of Wright’s claim of error. In identifying
which “interests [are] served by the particular procedural rule that was
[allegedly] infringed,”278 as contextual harmless error review requires, the
Fifth Circuit would have had to wrestle with many of the same issues as it
would had it analyzed the merits: To the extent there is a constitutional right
to testify, is the main or sole purpose of that right to protect the defendant
against an unjust outcome? Or, instead, is the right also meant to carve out
space within the criminal justice system for autonomous decision-making
and expression on the part of defendants, irrespective of their guilt or
innocence? If, in our hypothetical rerun of the Wright decision, the Fifth
Circuit had concluded that the right to testify is exclusively or primarily about
preventing wrongful convictions or other unjust outcomes,279 this would
suggest that Wright’s attorney did not violate his constitutional rights in
refusing to let him take the stand when, in the attorney’s judgment, testifying
would have harmed Wright’s prospects. If, however, the court had
determined that the right to testify also serves important participatory
interests,280 that conclusion would tend to show that the attorney acted
wrongfully in riding roughshod over Wright’s desire to tell his side of the
story and that, henceforth, attorneys should merely advise—not dictate—
when it comes to their clients’ right to testify.
In either scenario, a contextual assessment of harmlessness would have
shed valuable light on whether legal error occurred in Wright, thus clarifying
the applicable procedural rules. The larger point here, of course, is not
limited to Wright. By accounting for all legally protected interests and
thereby making harmless error review more lawlike, the second step of my
proposal would facilitate norm elaboration even in cases where, for one
reason or another, a reviewing court chooses to adjudicate harmlessness
before error.
277. But cf. supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text (explaining that in cases involving
unsettled legal questions, the first part of my proposal would tend to encourage, without
requiring, reviewing courts to address the merits before turning to harmlessness).
278. Murray, supra note 11, at 1791; see supra text accompanying notes 253–56.
279. This conception of the right to testify is suggested by the concurring opinion in Wright
II, 572 F.2d at 1072–73 (Thornberry, J., specially concurring) (characterizing the two central
questions as “who is in a better position to judge trial strategy and who is in a better position
to ensure the best interests of the defendant”). And, years later, it was also suggested in the
dissent in Arkansas v. Rock, 483 U.S. 44, 63 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“As a
general matter, the Court first recites, a defendant’s right to testify facilitates the truth-seeking
function of a criminal trial . . . . Such reasoning is hardly controlling here, where advancement
of the truth-seeking function of Rock’s trial was the sole motivation behind limiting her [posthypnotic] testimony.”).
280. This understanding animates the dissent in Wright II, 572 F.2d at 1075–84 (Godbold,
J., dissenting), and ultimately won out in Rock, 483 U.S. at 51–53. See Alexandra Natapoff,
Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1480 (2005)
(arguing that several constitutional rights, including the right to testify, “add up to a broad
expressive commitment” that “recognizes the inherent value in speakerhood and its intimate
connection to personal autonomy, dignity, and democratic participatory values”).
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C. Balancing
If a reviewing court applying this Article’s approach found that reversal
would substantially help to prevent future errors (at step one of the analysis)
or that the error caused substantial harm to a non-outcome-related interest (at
step two), the court would proceed to the third and final step of weighing the
benefits of reversal against its costs. The idea of weighing opposing interests
is hardly foreign to harmless error jurisprudence. Indeed, the reason harmless
error review—as opposed to automatic reversal or, for that matter, automatic
affirmance—applies to nearly all procedural errors is that courts and
legislatures see it as a way of striking a balance between fairness and
finality.281 Yet while balancing is central to the articulated justifications for
harmless error review, conventional harmless error rules do not call for courts
to weigh competing interests but instead to focus exclusively on determining
whether the error affected the outcome.282 The framework this Article
proposes, by contrast, would require reviewing courts to perform a balancing
analysis before ordering reversal as a means of preventing error or redressing
harm to a non-outcome-related interest.283
The potential benefits of reversal, relating to error prevention and redress,
were covered earlier in this part, so here I focus mainly on the cost side of
the scale. One set of costs has to do with duplication of effort. When a trial
court’s judgment is reversed due to procedural error, the government almost
always has the right to relitigate the reversed proceeding.284 When the
government exercises this prerogative, as it usually does, judges, courthouse
staff, lawyers, and litigants will need to expend time and energy in redoing
the earlier, invalidated proceeding.285 If a new trial must be held—not
merely a new pretrial or noncapital sentencing hearing—witnesses will have
281. See, e.g., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72–73 (1986). Courts also
frequently resort to balancing when deciding which outcome-centric harmless error test,
among a range of possible options, they should use in various procedural contexts. See, e.g.,
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993) (selecting the Kotteakos harmless error
test, instead of Chapman’s, with respect to constitutional errors raised during postconviction
review because of the supposed “imbalance of the costs and benefits of applying the Chapman
harmless-error standard on collateral review”).
282. See supra Part I.A.
283. It bears repeating that this Article does not propose that reviewing courts should be
able to deploy balancing to avoid reversal when an error has affected the outcome. Just like
under current law, a defendant could still establish harm, and thus be presumptively entitled
to reversal, by showing that the outcome was tainted by an error. Balancing would come into
play only in cases where current law would deny a remedy anyway. See supra note 234 and
accompanying text.
284. Although the double jeopardy rule forbids reprosecution when a conviction is reversed
due to the insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence, see Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,
11 (1978), reversals predicated on procedural errors do not preclude further prosecution except
in truly rare cases involving a combination of deliberate wrongdoing and severe prejudice,
see, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 253–55 (3d Cir. 2005); see also id. at 254
(noting that some jurisdictions entirely rule out dismissal with prejudice as a remedy for
procedural errors and that, “in all jurisdictions, dismissal with prejudice is in practice a rare
sanction for any constitutional violation”).
285. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, The Cost of Remands, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1025, 1031
(2012).
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to be resummoned, a new jury will be empaneled (unless there is a bench
trial), and the victims of the alleged crime, if any, are likely to suffer
additional trauma.286 In addition to the costs inherent in relitigation, reversal
can also lead to unjust, or less just, outcomes on remand, particularly in the
subset of cases we are dealing with here: cases in which an error has not
affected the outcome and reversal is contemplated on other grounds. The
“[p]assage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses may
render retrial difficult, even impossible,”287 thus enabling some defendants
who should be punished to escape conviction or, barring that, to secure an
undeservedly favorable plea or sentence.
Although these costs can be quite severe, often they are not—reversal’s
drawbacks, like its advantages, are highly variable. With respect to the first
problem, duplication of effort, a prolonged trial involving one or more
victims and numerous witnesses may well prove costly, both emotionally and
economically, to stage a second time.288 But many prosecuted crimes lack
victims,289 and many trials are fairly simple proceedings with few
witnesses.290 Straightforward trials arising from victimless crimes are not all
that burdensome to redo. And when it is only a defendant’s sentence that is
reversed or when a conviction procured through a plea rather than a trial is
undone, the hassle resulting from remand proceedings will typically be lower
still.291
Nor does reversal—even reversal for reasons unrelated to the integrity of
the outcome—inevitably pose a serious risk of precipitating a different or
worse outcome on remand. Sometimes it might—especially when a long
period of time has elapsed between the initial adjudication and the remand
286. See, e.g., Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 72.
287. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127–128 (1982) (making this point in relation to
postconviction review).
288. See supra notes 285–87 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Harmful Side Effects of Drug Prohibition, 2009 UTAH
L. REV. 11, 23 (“[D]rug laws attempt to prohibit conduct that is ‘victimless’ in a strictly
nonmoral or descriptive sense: there is no victim to complain to the police and to testify at
trial.” (emphasis omitted)).
290. See, e.g., DALE ANNE SIPES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., ON TRIAL: THE
LENGTH OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS 8–9 (1988) (finding, in a sample of state felony
prosecutions, that the median length of a jury trial was just over eleven hours (including jury
selection and deliberations) and the comparable figure for a nonjury trial was around 3.5
hours).
291. As to noncapital sentencing, see, for example, Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136
S. Ct. 1338, 1348–49 (2016) (“[A] remand for resentencing, while not costless, does not
invoke the same difficulties as a remand for retrial does.” (quoting United States v. Wernick,
691 F.3d 108, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2012))). The same is not true of capital sentencing, which
entails a penalty-phase jury trial that can wind up being every bit as elaborate as the guiltphase trial. See, e.g., CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 194, 196 (2016) (explaining that capital trials
have grown increasingly “intricate and lengthy,” “exert[ing] enormous pressures on the capital
system,” due in part to “the newly established ‘punishment phase’ in bifurcated trials” (citing
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000))). As to pleas, see, for example, Lafler v. Cooper,
566 U.S. 156, 172 (2012) (encouraging judges to “find[] a remedy that does not require the
prosecution to incur the expense of conducting a new trial” where ineffective assistance of
counsel caused the defendant to forgo a favorable plea and gamble on a trial).
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proceedings, potentially causing evidence to deteriorate and jeopardizing the
government’s ability to put its best foot forward.292 In many cases, however,
the lag time separating the remand from the first proceeding is not so great
as to threaten a significant loss of evidence.293 And even to the extent
important evidence has degraded over time, in certain circumstances, the
government can still make its case by introducing the former testimony of
unavailable witnesses294 or by relying on other exceptions to the hearsay
rule.295 None of these options is a perfect substitute for laying out the same
evidence that the government chose to introduce—in the same format the
government chose to introduce it—during the first iteration of the
proceeding. But the existence of work-arounds at least partially offsets the
danger that reversing a defendant’s conviction or sentence will place the
government at an unfair disadvantage on remand.
Moreover, the conviction and sentence from the first proceeding is not
necessarily a sound measure of justice against which any possible departures
on remand, such as an acquittal, dismissal, lenient plea, or lesser sentence,
must be judged. Criminal codes in the United States are notoriously
overbroad and harsh; police and prosecutors wield vast discretion over what
and whom to criminalize and how much punishment is warranted—a level
of discretion often used to extract pleas and repress low-income people and
people of color rather than to achieve justice; numerous wrongful convictions
have come to light in recent decades, while countless others likely still remain
hidden from view; and the United States cages over two million people in its
prisons and jails—a larger per capita share than any other country in the
world—and criminalizes millions more people through punishments other
than incarceration.296 To be sure, it does not follow from these
292. Loss of evidence due to delay is one of the main reasons why awarding relief at the
postconviction review stage is more costly, all else equal, than reversing on direct appeal. See,
e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?: Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 147 (1970).
293. Cf. NICOLE L. WATERS & KATHRYN J. GENTHON, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
ACHIEVING TIMELY RESOLUTION FOR CRIMINAL APPEALS IN STATE COURTS 1 (2016),
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/criminal/id/275/page/0/inline/criminal_
275_0 [https://perma.cc/UW6U-6KLU] (“Across all [state] appellate courts with criminal
jurisdiction, half of all non-death penalty criminal appeals were resolved within 297 days—
just under 10 months.”).
294. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1)(B) (allowing the admission of an unavailable
witness’s former testimony when “offered against a party who had . . . an opportunity and
similar motive to develop [the testimony] by direct, cross-, or redirect examination”).
295. Indeed, because “[r]eliable hearsay is . . . admissible during sentencing proceedings,”
United States v. Ramirez-Negron, 751 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2014), sentencing-only remands
can often be relitigated based on little more than the transcript of the initial sentencing hearing,
along with any new points the parties may wish to bring up in response to the concerns that
led the reviewing court to set aside the prior sentence.
296. As to overcriminalization and harshness, see, for example, William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 512–19 (2001). As to misuse
of law enforcement discretion, see, for example, Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor:
Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408–16 (2001). As
to wrongful convictions, see, for example, Samuel R. Gross, What We Think, What We Know
and What We Think We Know About False Convictions, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 753, 756–69
(2017). As to mass incarceration and nonincarceration punishments, see, for example, Wendy
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generalizations that the disposition in any specific case is unjust or that a
more lenient judgment on remand would improve on that case’s outcome.
But the powerful indictments directed against the U.S. criminal justice
system do at least problematize the notion that the lower criminal courts tend
to get things right the first time and that, if a remand results in a less severe
outcome, something must have gone dreadfully wrong.
Admittedly, there is no guarantee that reviewing courts would see eye to
eye with me or, more importantly, with each other regarding the weights that
should be assigned to reversal’s costs and benefits. In applying the
framework I propose, judges who are inclined to prioritize efficiency and
finality over procedural fairness would likely err on the side of affirmance in
close cases, while judges with opposing proclivities would be more open to
reversal. Some scholars may see this as a reason to abandon the project
undertaken here297 or to embrace a bright-line rule of some kind—such as,
for example, a rule of automatic reversal for recurring patterns of error or for
certain categories of obvious errors298—in place of a balancing test.
Despite the subjectivity inherent in balancing,299 I remain convinced that
it is the right approach where reversal is sought for the sake of error
prevention or redress for non-outcome-related harm. As reviewing courts are
heavily predisposed to affirm criminal judgments,300 adoption of this
Article’s proposal seems unlikely to precipitate a flood of unwarranted
reversals—there would surely be some, but not many. I am far more
concerned about mistakes in the other direction: courts opting to affirm in
cases where a sound evaluation of the relevant interests points toward
reversal. But under current law, courts are required to affirm in such cases
anyway (unless the error affected the outcome).301 The framework this
Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/9LVNQBN6].
297. Cf. Epps, supra note 35, at 2158 (criticizing contextual harmless error review as
“indeterminate” because “[t]here is without doubt signiﬁcant disagreement—both within the
judiciary and without—about the social costs of reversal and the value of particular
constitutional rights”); Brandon L. Garrett, Response, Patterns of Error, 130 HARV. L. REV.
F. 287, 288 (2017) (responding to Murray, supra note 11, and suggesting that contextual
harmless error review might make appellate and postconviction courts’ remedial decisionmaking even more erratic than it currently is by “liberat[ing] judges to further rely on their
own value judgments”).
298. Cf. supra note 238 (discussing Kamin’s proposal requiring automatic reversal for clear
prosecutorial errors implicating constitutional rights).
299. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 973–76 (1987) (arguing that balancing as a mode of legal analysis “demand[s]
the development of a scale of values external to [judges’] personal preferences” but that no
such scale has yet been conceived). It is worth noting that even though conventional harmless
error rules do not entail balancing, they still “require[] . . . judgment transcending confinement
by formula or precise rule”—judgment that “varies with judges and also with circumstance.”
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946).
300. See, e.g., Michael Heise et al., State Criminal Appeals Revealed, 70 VAND. L. REV.
1939, 1953 tbl.3 (2017) (demonstrating that for defense appeals from state court decisions,
only 14.9 percent of first-level appeals as of right and 2.8 percent of appeals in a court of last
resort resulted in reversal or any lesser form of relief for the defendant).
301. See supra Part I.A.
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Article proposes would at least create space within the doctrinal landscape
for courts to consider whether reversal is justified for reasons other than
outcome-determinative prejudice.
As for the idea of seeking reform through the expansion of automatic
reversal rather than through balancing, the past half century of harmless error
case law and commentary provides a cautionary tale. As explained in Part
I,302 scholars have been urging courts for decades to exempt additional
categories of procedural error from harmless error review, but their pleas
have by and large fallen on deaf ears. Courts are generally reluctant to
reverse simply because a particular type of error occurred, without examining
the details of what happened and how harmful the violation truly was. I take
courts’ reservations seriously and would allow them to consider the totality
of the circumstances—not merely the category of procedural error at issue—
in deciding whether to reverse despite the absence of outcome-determinative
prejudice. Commentators who worry that the harmless error rule is overused
to affirm criminal convictions and sentences might not find this solution
completely satisfying. But since, in my view, it is rare to find a procedural
right that, when violated, will always or almost always be harmful enough to
justify reversal, automatic reversal is too rigid to work well in most doctrinal
contexts. This Article’s approach would afford the flexibility courts need to
judge each error on its own merits without ascribing undue weight to the
error’s doctrinal label.
D. Possible Extensions
Up to this point, I have couched my prescriptions as an alternative
framework for conducting harmless error analysis. But why stop there? As
Brandon Garrett has pointed out, conventional harmless error rules are just
one dimension of a “larger judicial and statutory [trend] toward stripping
judicial review in criminal cases.”303 This section explores the possibility of
further extending the reach of my proposal so as to loosen other controversial
restrictions on access to reversal—restrictions having to do with so-called
prejudice-based rights and forfeited claims.

302. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
303. Garrett, supra note 297, at 291 (listing “a wide range of procedural obstacles” to
postconviction review and emphasizing that “the Supreme Court has interpreted a range of
constitutional criminal procedure rules to incorporate . . . a second layer of harmless error
rules” into the doctrinal test for error). In light of the formidable array of hurdles that now
confront defendants who seek appellate and postconviction relief, Garrett suggests that “[the]
trend toward more restrictive harmless error review” is no longer “an important mechanism
for regulating the review of criminal convictions.” Id. I would not go that far. For one thing,
conventional harmless error rules, as opposed to what Garrett calls the “second layer of
harmless error rules,” id., are still among the most daunting barriers defendants face in
criminal litigation, especially on direct appeal. See supra notes 27, 194. And while I agree
with Garrett that what he calls the “second layer of harmless error rules,” Garrett, supra note
297, at 291, are profoundly important and problematic, this Article’s framework for reforming
conventional harmless error rules would probably work quite well for Garrett’s second-layer
rules, too. See infra Part III.D.1.
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1. Prejudice-Based Rights
The harmless error rule is remedial in nature: it applies only when a
reviewing court finds, or assumes without deciding, that a legal error has
occurred, and the court must then decide whether that error entitles the
defendant to relief in the form of reversal.304 For some procedural rights,
however, harm—defined doctrinally as outcome-determinative prejudice—
has been classified as an element of the right itself rather than a distinct
remedial issue. These rights, which I have previously termed “outcomecentric prejudice-based rights,” or “prejudice-based rights” for short, “apply
only when failing to apply them would cause prejudice” by affecting the
outcome.305 Two of criminal procedure’s most important rights—Brady v.
Maryland306 and effective assistance of counsel307—likely qualify as
prejudice-based rights under current Supreme Court precedent,308 which
generally requires the defense to establish a “reasonable probability” of
304. This, at any rate, is the traditional way to understand the harmless error doctrine. See,
e.g., Meltzer, supra note 35, at 17. Dan Epps has recently staked out a contrary position,
arguing that “harmless error analysis is best understood as an inquiry about constitutional
rights, not remedies” because, in his view, subjecting violations of a right to harmless error
review is “functionally indistinguishable” from making prejudice part of the right. Epps, supra
note 35, at 2122, 2162; see also Daniel Epps, The Right Approach to Harmless Error, 120
COLUM. L. REV. F. 1 (2020). I disagree with Epps on this issue for reasons I have spelled out
elsewhere. See Murray, supra note 14, at 296–97, 297 n.110; accord John M. Greabe,
Criminal Procedure Rights and Harmless Error: A Response to Professor Epps, 118 COLUM.
L. REV. ONLINE 118 (2018).
305. Murray, supra note 14, at 283.
306. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady has come to stand for the proposition that a defendant has
the right to obtain favorable, “material” evidence within the government’s knowledge, where
evidence is material “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality opinion) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
307. Under Strickland, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel ordinarily
must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency was
prejudicial, meaning that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). But cf. Eve Brensike Primus, Disaggregating
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Doctrine: Four Forms of Constitutional Ineffectiveness, 72
STAN. L. REV. 1581 (2020) (emphasizing the often overlooked point that Strickland, though
applicable to ineffective assistance claims involving “personal” and “episodic” errors by
counsel, does not cover ineffectiveness that has “structural” causes or that is “pervasive”); Eve
Brensike Primus & Justin Murray, Redefining Strickland Prejudice After Weaver v.
Massachusetts, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 22, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.
org/redefining-strickland-prejudice-after-weaver-v-massachusetts [https://perma.cc/NMM86UDC] (arguing that even when Strickland is applicable, there is room to argue that “an
attorney’s deficient performance is prejudicial when counsel’s errors rendered the trial process
fundamentally unfair—even if those errors did not have a probable effect on the trial
outcome”).
308. See Murray, supra note 14, at 285–89 (arguing that relevant Supreme Court decisions
suggest that Brady and effective assistance are prejudice-based rights, while acknowledging
that some courts and commentators interpret the decisions differently). “In addition to Brady
and effective assistance of counsel, a number of other constitutional rights”—mainly relating
to access to evidence and prosecutorial misconduct at trial—“also contain outcome-centric
prejudice requirements according to the Supreme Court’s precedents.” Id. at 290.
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outcome-determinative prejudice to prevail on such claims.309 If the
doctrinal shifts this part advocates were limited to harmless error review, they
would not impact how reviewing courts assess prejudice in contexts where
prejudice is viewed as an element of the right rather than a remedial issue.
But there is nothing natural or inevitable about the way prejudice has been
conceptualized in doctrinal areas like Brady and effective assistance of
counsel. In an earlier article, I argued that stitching prejudice into the fabric
of procedural rights can be dangerous insofar as it “narrow[s] the scope of
defendants’ rights not only in appellate and postconviction proceedings, as
intended, but also at the trial court level, where finality is not at stake and
where judges and other actors must decide in the first instance what rights
mean and how to enforce them.”310 Because of this concern, I proposed that
courts should “eliminate prejudice from the definition of Brady, effective
assistance of counsel, and possibly other outcome-centric prejudice-based
rights” while still “permit[ting] consideration of prejudice . . . when a
convicted defendant seeks the remedy of reversal via appellate or
postconviction review”—or, more simply, they should “move prejudice from
rights to remedies.”311 Some courts have embraced this strategy already,
holding that the prejudice requirements found in Brady and effective
assistance doctrine are remedial rules that, much like harmless error review,
apply only when a defendant seeks reversal or comparable forms of relief.312
To the extent courts are prepared to reconceptualize Brady, effective
assistance, and perhaps other prejudice-based rights along these lines, it
would not require much analytical legwork to bring them within the ambit of

309. Supra notes 306–08.
310. Murray, supra note 14, at 280 (footnote omitted). Other scholars have also attacked
the anomalous conception of prejudice reflected in Brady and effective assistance
jurisprudence for a range of reasons. As to Brady, see, for example, Alafair S. Burke,
Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481 (2009). As to effective assistance, see,
for example, Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 327–28 (1988).
311. Murray, supra note 14, at 319. I also argued that courts should employ contextual
harmless error review with respect to Brady and effective assistance claims to redress harm to
interests not relating to the outcome:
[G]overnmental suppression of evidence and deficient representation by defense
counsel can both cause harm to an array of private and public interests—such as
autonomy, equal justice for rich and poor, transparency, and separation of powers—
even when the risk of prejudice to the outcome is slim to none. The
Brady/Strickland test for prejudice blinds courts to these forms of harm by directing
them to focus exclusively on whether evidence suppression or deficient
representation affected the outcome. Contextual harmless error review would
remedy that oversight, since it would “assess harm in relation to the constellation of
interests served by the particular procedural rule that was infringed”—as relevant
here, Brady or effective assistance of counsel—“and would not, as under existing
law, automatically confine the [prejudice] inquiry to estimating the error’s effect on
the outcome.”
Id. at 324 (second alternation in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Murray, supra note 11,
at 1791). See generally supra Part III.B (discussing contextual harmless error review and how
it fits within this Article’s proposal).
312. See Murray, supra note 14, at 322 (collecting cases).
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this Article’s harmless error framework.313 That would be a salutary
development. Brady and the right to effective assistance of counsel are
widely and rightly regarded as paper tigers—grand symbols of our collective
commitment to fairness, but symbols that have utterly failed in practice to
make good on their respective promises.314 A heightened threat of reversal
in the Brady context could help spur line prosecutors to err on the side of
disclosure, while also motivating higher-ups to alter their discovery policies,
training protocols, and personnel choices in ways that increase the flow of
information to the defense.315 And while an elevated prospect of reversal for
ineffective assistance seems unlikely to have much direct impact on defense
lawyers’ incentives, it could potentially induce the government to infuse
desperately needed funds into resource-starved indigent defense systems—
or, conceivably, to bring fewer prosecutions, thereby reducing caseload
burdens—so that defense attorneys will be better equipped to advocate for
their clients.316 Thus, while this Article’s immediate target is the harmless
error doctrine, prejudice-based rights like Brady and effective assistance do
not lie far outside its crosshairs.
2. Review of Forfeited Claims
Remedial law does not look with favor on forfeited claims. Criminal
defendants, like other litigants, are expected to assert any claim they might
have in a timely fashion; if they fail to do so, the claim is deemed forfeited.317
Forfeitures are rarely excused. While many scholars worry that a strict policy
against reviewing forfeited claims unfairly punishes defendants for the
313. Indeed, if courts were to expressly classify the prejudice elements that are hardwired
into various prejudice-based rights as forms of harmless error review, my proposal would
reach them automatically. But even if those elements were simply “move[d] . . . from rights
to remedies,” id. at 319, without explicitly labeling them as harmless error rules, courts could
still borrow from a reformed harmless error doctrine in light of the functional similarities
between harmless error review and other prejudice restrictions that are conceptually positioned
on the remedy side of the right-remedy divide.
314. See, e.g., Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122
YALE L.J. 2176, 2190–91 (2013) (arguing that the right to state-appointed counsel “has been
a spectacular failure” partly because “[i]ndigent defense has been grossly underfunded, where
it is provided at all”); Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L.
REV. 685, 728 (2006) (“[M]ore than any other rule of criminal procedure, the Brady rule has
been the most fertile and widespread source of misconduct by prosecutors . . . .”).
315. See supra notes 133–50 and accompanying text (discussing why and how a credible
prospect of reversal can reduce prosecutor-driven procedural error).
316. See supra notes 145–50 and accompanying text (explaining that reversal functions as
a collective sanction that can impact group behavior). This Article’s remedial framework
would also bring other benefits, beyond the prophylactic considerations just mentioned, if
applied to Brady and effective assistance claims. See supra note 311 (discussing the need to
redress forms of harm besides outcome-determinative prejudice that can result from evidence
suppression and inadequate representation).
317. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–32 (1993). Forfeiture—the
failure to assert one’s rights at the appropriate time—is different from, yet often confused
with, waiver, which involves an affirmative relinquishment of rights. See Ian S. Speir & Nima
H. Mohebbi, Preservation Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
281, 284 (2015). This subsection deals only with forfeiture.
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mistakes of their lawyers318 and incentivizes judicial and prosecutorial
error,319 courts view such a policy as essential to “prevent[] a litigant from
‘sandbagging’ the court [by] remaining silent about his objection and
belatedly raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor.”320
Thus, the plain error rule that governs federal appeals, a rule with many state
law analogues,321 forbids reversal premised on forfeited claims unless the
defendant can overcome several daunting hurdles, among them a harmless
error standard demanding proof of a “reasonable probability” that the error
affected the outcome.322 (The plain error rule’s other requirements are
discussed below.)323 Likewise, to succeed with a forfeited claim in a federal
postconviction proceeding, a defendant generally must establish both
“cause” for failing to raise the claim earlier—whether at the trial court level,
on appeal, or during state postconviction proceedings—and “prejudice” that
would result if the court refused to consider the claim.324 For purposes of the
318. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and
Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 683 (1990) (making
this point with respect to federal habeas law’s cause-and-prejudice rule). Other times—as
when the law plainly foreclosed a potential objection at the time of trial proceedings but
subsequently changed prior to the time of review—neither the defendant nor defense counsel
is at fault for failing to raise an objection, yet many forfeiture rules still penalize the defendant
in this scenario. See, e.g., Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal
Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922, 956–58 (2006) (criticizing the federal plain error rule for
presumptively barring relief in situations where the law has substantially changed between the
initial proceeding and review).
319. See generally, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Does It Matter Who Objects?: Rethinking the
Burden to Prevent Errors in Criminal Process, 98 TEX. L. REV. 625 (2020) (arguing that
judges and prosecutors are generally the “cheapest cost avoider[s]” when it comes to legal
error in the criminal process and thus that forfeiture rules mistakenly allocate the duty of care
for preventing errors to defendants).
320. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009) (first quoting Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977); and then citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 72 (2002)). A
number of commentators have attacked this justification, arguing that “counsel’s failure [to
object] is usually the result of his inattention, his ignorance of either the applicable law or the
facts of his client’s case, or his inability to appreciate the tactical value or constitutional worth
of an objection” rather than a calculated choice to conceal an ace in the hole. Peter W. Tague,
Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has
Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1, 46 (1978).
321. See 7 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 97, § 27.5(d).
322. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2004); see also supra note
44 and accompanying text (discussing the Olano harmless error test).
323. See infra notes 325–33.
324. E.g., Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87 (holding that, where the defendant failed to object to the
admission of evidence during a state trial, he could not raise the claim in a federal
postconviction proceeding “absent a showing of ‘cause’ and ‘prejudice’” (citing Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976))). While the Supreme Court has said that a constitutional
error causing a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” can be reviewed in a federal habeas
proceeding even where no cause has been shown for a forfeiture, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 495–46 (1986) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)), this exception to the
cause-and-prejudice rule is almost never used and hinges largely on the defendants’ ability to
prove their own innocence, see Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 303, 336–42 (1993). Also, when, as in Sykes, the prosecution relies on state law
forfeiture rules to block federal review, the federal court can disregard the forfeiture and
review the defendant’s claim—without finding cause and prejudice—if the state’s forfeiture
rule is designed or applied in a manner that unduly subverts federal rights, though this work-
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cause-and-prejudice rule, prejudice appears to bear the same meaning as it
does in the plain error context, obligating the defendant to show a reasonable
probability that, without the error, the outcome would have been different.325
Even without any extension or modification, the approach laid out in this
Article would apply to the harmless error element of the federal plain error
rule (and comparable state rules326), enabling a defendant to satisfy that part
of the rule either by establishing a reasonable probability that the error
affected the outcome327 or by showing that reversal’s benefits outweigh its
costs.328 On the other hand, the plain error rule’s remaining requirements—
that the error must be “plain” (meaning “‘clear’ or, equivalently,
‘obvious’”)329 and must “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings”330—would not be displaced or affected
by my proposal (unless it were expanded along the lines suggested below).
Similarly, the prejudice element of the federal cause-and-prejudice rule,
which functions exactly like a harmless error rule even though it is not
labeled as one,331 would be softened, allowing the defendant to prove harm
either in the traditional fashion (i.e., by showing a reasonable probability of
outcome-determinative prejudice) or through the balancing test proposed
here. The cause element of the cause-and-prejudice rule, however, would
remain intact.332
around, too, is rarely utilized. See Eve Brensike Primus, Federal Review of State Criminal
Convictions: A Structural Approach to Adequacy Doctrine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 75, 106–10
(2017).
325. See, e.g., Amy Knight Burns, Note, Insurmountable Obstacles: Structural Errors,
Procedural Default, and Ineffective Assistance, 64 STAN. L. REV. 727, 748 (2012) (noting that,
in cases involving both the Sykes cause-and-prejudice rule and the prejudice prong of
Strickland’s test for ineffective assistance of counsel, “most courts evaluating such claims
have collapsed them, holding that a satisfaction of the Strickland standard satisfies the Sykes
prejudice inquiry, or vice versa”).
326. See supra notes 49, 73 (discussing state analogues).
327. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (explaining how outcome-centric harmless
error rules fit within my proposed framework as one part of a multidimensional analysis).
328. See supra Part III.C.
329. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (first citing United States v. Young,
470 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1985); and then citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982)).
330. Id. at 736 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
331. See generally supra note 304 and accompanying text (explaining that harmless error
rules use the concept of prejudice or harm to limit access to particular remedies—as relevant
here, the remedy of federal postconviction relief).
332. Reforming the prejudice element of the cause-and-prejudice rule without also
changing how the cause element gets administered would accomplish little in the multitude of
cases where a defendant tries to show cause by alleging a Brady violation or ineffective
assistance of counsel led to the forfeiture. In such cases, the defendant would still have to
establish outcome-determinative prejudice as part of the Brady or ineffective assistance claim.
See generally supra notes 306–10 and accompanying text (discussing the prejudice test for
Brady and ineffective assistance claims). If, however, prejudice were removed from the
definitions of Brady and the right to effective assistance of counsel and reconceptualized as a
remedial issue, as suggested in the previous subsection, and as many scholars and judges
support, see supra notes 310, 312 and accompanying text, a defendant could establish cause
premised on a Brady violation or ineffective assistance without first needing to prove a
reasonable probability that the outcome was affected. The defendant would, of course, have
to establish prejudice in connection with the prejudice element of the cause-and-prejudice rule,
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These reforms would mark a significant shift in how courts review
forfeited claims. But they could also lay the groundwork for further measures
aimed at relaxing claim forfeiture doctrine. Reshaping harmless error review
to account for all relevant costs of reversal, including the very costs that
motivate claim forfeiture rules,333 would lessen the real or perceived need for
categorical barriers to relief, such as the plain error rule’s clear-or-obviouserror element334 or the cause element of the cause-and-prejudice rule.335 The
factors identified by these elements—whether the error is clear-cut and
whether the defendant can show good cause for failing to raise the claim
earlier—are undoubtedly relevant to a global assessment of reversal’s costs
and benefits. Yet if, when all is said and done, a thorough analysis of the
relevant interests indicates that reversal is warranted for the sake of
deterrence, redress, or both and is net beneficial even when the error’s
ambiguity and other countervailing considerations are placed on the scale,
denial of relief becomes rather difficult to defend.336 By providing an
alternative outlet—a more flexible and, arguably, fairer one—for
effectuating the policies that underlie claim forfeiture doctrine, this Article’s
reconfiguration of harmless error review could potentially prompt
rulemakers to reassess whether and to what extent categorical impediments
to relief are truly necessary on account of forfeiture.

but that element is covered by this Article’s proposed reforms and thus would no longer
require a showing of outcome-determinative prejudice.
333. See supra note 320 and accompanying text (discussing the potential problem of
tactical delay in raising defense objections); cf. supra notes 284–97 and accompanying text
(discussing other costs associated with reversal without focusing specifically on forfeiture).
334. See generally supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the clear-or-obviouserror element of the plain error rule). The concept of clear-or-obvious error plays a much
different role in plain error doctrine than it does in my proposal. For one thing, an error must
be clear-cut to warrant reversal under the plain error rule, Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, whereas
under this Article’s approach, an error’s obviousness is neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for reversal but merely an important factor weighing in the defendant’s favor when
it is present, see supra notes 244–49. Moreover, “whether a legal question was settled or
unsettled at the time of trial, ‘it is enough that an error be “plain” at the time of appellate
consideration’” to satisfy Olano’s clear-or-obvious-error requirement. Henderson v. United
States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997)).
Under this Article’s framework, by contrast, for an error’s obviousness to weigh in favor of
reversal for prophylactic reasons, it must be obviously illegal at the time of commission, not
merely at the time of appellate or postconviction review. See supra notes 244–49.
335. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (“So long as a defendant is
represented by counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective . . . the existence
of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that
some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the
State’s procedural rule.”).
336. There are counterarguments, to be sure. Perhaps most importantly, one could argue
that bright-line rules, such as the clear-or-obvious-error restriction, are needed to guard against
the risk that courts, in applying a discretionary balancing test, might underrate society’s
interest in inducing defendants to raise claims at the earliest opportunity in order to prevent
errors and preserve finality. But cf. supra note 300 and accompanying text (arguing that the
balancing inquiry envisioned here is unlikely to cause many unwarranted reversals).
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CONCLUSION
Although criminal defendants’ procedural rights are routinely violated in
the lower courts, generating enormous harm in the aggregate, accountability
is in short supply. Even when trial judges, prosecutors, and the organizations
and larger systems in which they are embedded repeatedly violate the same
rule, in one case after the next, reviewing courts are generally constrained by
the harmless error doctrine to disregard illegal conduct from past cases—
along with the risk that such conduct will be repeated in future cases—and to
focus exclusively on whether the error affected the outcome in the case
currently being reviewed.
I think it is a mistake to curtail criminal review in this manner. In addition
to deciding whether an error caused outcome-determinative prejudice and, if
so, ordering reversal, reviewing courts should also assess whether reversal is
needed to prevent future errors or to redress harm to other interests—besides
the defendant’s interest in the outcome—that procedural law aims to
safeguard. They should then balance reversal’s benefits, relating to error
prevention and redress, against its costs to determine whether reversal is
warranted.337 This method of harmless error review would not always
generate easy or uncontroversial answers. But it at least has the virtue of
asking the right questions. Rather than ignoring comparable procedural
violations committed in prior cases and what those violations portend for the
future, this Article’s approach invites courts to identify patterns of error that
link the past, present, and (probable) future so that such patterns can be
disrupted. And instead of artificially reducing the concept of harm to the
single dimension of outcome-determinative prejudice, the framework I
propose takes into account the full range of interests that procedural law
deems worthy of protection. These new tools would place reviewing courts
in a far stronger position to police procedural error in the lower criminal
courts.

337. The balancing test I propose would not apply where a defendant seeks reversal based
on outcome-determinative prejudice: just like under current law, reversal would be
presumptively required if an error has affected the outcome. Balancing would come into play
only when reversal is contemplated on deterrence grounds or based on injury to non-outcomerelated interests.

